The impact of taxation and signposting on diet: an online field study with breakfast cereals and soft drinks by Zizzo, Daniel et al.
This is a repository copy of The impact of taxation and signposting on diet: an online field 
study with breakfast cereals and soft drinks.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/135810/
Version: Published Version
Monograph:
Zizzo, Daniel, Parravano, Melanie, Nakamura, Ryota et al. (2 more authors) (2016) The 
impact of taxation and signposting on diet: an online field study with breakfast cereals and 
soft drinks. Report. CHE Research Paper . Centre for Health Economics, University of 
York , York, UK. 
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
CHE Research Paper 131
The Impact of Taxation and 
Signposting on Diet: An Online 
Field Study with Breakfast 
Cereals and Soft Drinks
Daniel John Zizzo, Melanie Parravano,
Ryota Nakamura, Suzanna Forwood,
Marc Suhrcke
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The impact of taxation and signposting on diet: an online field study 
with breakfast cereals and soft drinks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
Daniel John Zizzo 
2
Melanie Parravano 
3
Ryota Nakamura 
4
Suzanna Forwood 
3
Marc Suhrcke
 
 
 
 
 
1
 BENC and Newcastle University, UK 
2
BHRU and Newcastle University, UK
 
3
Centre for Health Economics, University of York, York, UK 
4
Anglia Ruskin University, UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
June 2016 
  
Background to series 
CHE Discussion Papers (DPs) began publication in 1983 as a means of making current 
research material more widely available to health economists and other potential users. So 
as to speed up the dissemination process, papers were originally published by CHE and 
distributed by post to a worldwide readership.  
 
The CHE Research Paper series takes over that function and provides access to current 
research output via web-based publication, although hard copy will continue to be available 
(but subject to charge). 
 
Acknowledgements 
This report is independent research commissioned and funded by the Department of Health 
Policy Research Programme (Policy Research Unit in Behaviour and Health (PR-UN-0409-
10109)).The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and not necessarily 
those of the Department of Health. We also gratefully acknowledge the support of the 
UKCRC Centre for Diet and Physical Activity Research (CEDAR) and the ESRC (Network for 
Integrated Behavioural Science, ES/K002201/1). We thank Susan Jebb, Bruce Lyons, Peter 
Moffatt, Theresa Marteau, Vicki Pyne, Martin Roland, Richard Smith, Robert Sugden and 
participants to presentations at Cambridge, East Anglia, Essen, Newcastle, Nottingham, 
Reading and York for relevant encouragement and advice. The usual disclaimer applies. 
 
Further copies 
Copies of this paper are freely available to download from the CHE website 
www.york.ac.uk/che/publications/ Access to downloaded material is provided on the 
understanding that it is intended for personal use. Copies of downloaded papers may be 
distributed to third-parties subject to the proviso that the CHE publication source is properly 
acknowledged and that such distribution is not subject to any payment. 
 
Printed copies are available on request at a charge of £5.00 per copy. Please contact the 
CHE Publications Office, email che-pub@york.ac.uk, telephone 01904 321405 for further 
details. 
 
Centre for Health Economics 
Alcuin College 
University of York 
York, UK 
www.york.ac.uk/che 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Daniel John Zizzo, Melanie Parravano, Ryota Nakamura, Suzanna Forwood, Marc Suhrcke 
The impact of taxation and signposting on diet: an online field study with breakfast cereals and soft drinks  i 
 
 
Abstract 
We present a large scale study where a nationally representative sample of 1,000 participants were 
asked to make real purchases within an online supermarket platform.  The study captured the effect 
of price changes, and of the signposting of such changes, for breakfast cereals and soft drinks.  We 
find that such taxes are an effective means of altering food purchasing, with a 20% rate being 
sufficient to make a significant impact.  Signposting represents a complementary nudge policy that 
could enhance the impact of the tax without imposing severe welfare loss, though the effectiveness 
may depend on the product category. 
 
Keywords: taxes, signposting, healthy diet, nudges, public health. 
 
JEL classification numbers: C93, D12, H31, I1. 
 
Extended Abstract 
Background PƵƌƌĞŶƚƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨĂĨŝƐĐĂůƉŽůŝĐǇŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐĂ ‘ƐƵŐĂƌƚĂǆ ? ?
on dietary behavior is limited and based on econometric and modelling data, or on experimental 
studies using hypothetical purchase choices.  This study presents a large scale field study: a 
nationally representative sample of participants was asked to make real purchases within an online 
supermarket platform.  The study captured price elasticity for two products of policy interest: 
breakfast cereals and soft drinks, as well as the impact of how those changes are signposted to the 
consumer.  
 
Methods: 1,000 participants, with latent demand for breakfast cereals and soft drinks, were 
randomly allocated to one of two conditions (signposted or not signposted) and completed ten 
shopping tasks using an online supermarket platform.  They were given a budget of £10 and were 
aware that a randomly determined task would be played out for real: they received the groceries 
chosen and any unspent budget.  For each of the 10 tasks, the supermarket contained either 
breakfast cereals (five tasks) or soft drinks (five tasks), and the pricing either matched a UK grocery 
retailer (baseline), or a subset of products received a tax of either 20% or 40% to either the healthier 
or less healthy items within the supermarket. Participants could fill a one week shopping diary after 
groceries were delivered.  
 
Results: When the taxes were signposted to consumers, both the 20% and 40% rates reduced 
purchase volume of all the products they were applied to.  When the taxes were not signposted, 
reductions in purchase volume were only seen in less healthy breakfast cereals and healthier soft 
drinks at 20% taxation, and in less healthy breakfast cereals and all soft drinks at 40% taxation.  
There were no significant differences in the effects from taxation between socioeconomic groups. 
 
Discussion: Fiscal policies that tax food or drinks may be an effective means of altering food 
purchasing, with a 20% rate being sufficient to make a significant impact in relation to breakfast 
cereals and soft drinks.  Signposting represents a complementary  ‘nudge ? policy that could enhance 
the impact of the tax without imposing severe welfare loss, though the effectiveness may depend on 
the product category.  Expectations that taxation would reduce socioeconomic inequalities in diet 
may be overstated, but neither is there reason for concern that overall diet improvement would 
have to come at the cost of increasing socioeconomic inequalities.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper presents a large scale online study with a nationally representative sample from the 
United Kingdom to look at the effect of price changes, and ways in which these price changes are 
presented, on healthy diet choice in relation to breakfast cereals and soft drinks.
1
  Participants in our 
study used real budgets and had an opportunity to buy real groceries online which were then 
delivered to their door.  The groceries were from a list of almost 1,000 products offered by Tesco, 
the largest U.K. supermarket retailer, and checks were made for any effect of online purchases on 
later purchases to better identify the net effect of our potential policy interventions. 
 
There has been considerable recent policy interest in the potential use of fiscal policy to influence 
dietary behavior (Mytton et al. 2012), for example in the form of a  ‘ĨĂƚƚĂǆ ?ŽƌŽĨĂ ‘ƐƵŐĂƌƚĂǆ ? as 
already trialed in different forms in Australia, Chile, Denmark, France, Hungary, Mexico and Norway  
(Cornelsen and Carreido 2015; Ells et al., 2015).  There is in principle a defendable justification for 
public policy to correct what may be conceived as a market failure associated with the external costs 
arising from obesity.  In collectively funded health insurance systems, healthy-weight individuals will 
subsidize the medical care costs of obese individuals.  The higher medical care costs may be passed 
on to the public in the form of higher payroll or income taxes, which in turn leads to decreased labor 
supply (Cawley and Frisvold 2015).  While it is widely recognized that the case for diet-related 
taxation is far more nuanced than that for other commodities such as tobacco and alcohol, there is a 
perhaps surprising heterogeneity in the conclusions from the existing modeling and econometric 
evidence.
2
  The experimental evidence, which is almost entirely based on hypothetical choices, is 
also mixed (Epstein et al. 2007).
3
 
 
Perhaps the most interesting evidence comes from the actual real world experiences of the 
implementation of significant fiscal policy measures (Wareham and Jebb 2015); this is also mixed, 
however, as apparent for example from what some see as a failure of the Danish fat tax (Snowdon, 
2015) and conversely the seeming success of the Mexican excise tax on on sugary soft drinks 
(Colchero et al., 2016).  There is obviously an important role for randomized studies to go hand in 
hand with an analysis of actually implemented fiscal policies.
4
  
                                                 
1
 &ŽƌĞĂƐĞŽĨƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚŝƐƉĂƉĞƌǁĞƌĞĨĞƌƚŽ ‘ďƌĞĂŬĨĂƐƚĐĞƌĞĂůƐ ?ĂƐƐŝŵƉůǇ ‘ĐĞƌĞĂůƐ ? ? 
2
 While, for instance, Thow et al. (2014 ? ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞ ƚŚĂƚ  “ƚĂǆĞƐ ĂŶĚ ƐƵďƐŝĚŝĞƐ ŽŶ ĨŽŽĚ ŚĂǀĞ ƚŚĞ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ƚŽ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ
ĐŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůǇĂŶĚŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŚĞĂůƚŚ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇǁŚĞŶƚŚĞǇĂƌĞůĂƌŐĞ ? ?ŽƌŶĞůƐĞŶĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ?a, p.18) argue that 
 “ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ Ă ƉƌŽƉĞƌ appreciation of the potential indirect impacts we do not know the overall impact of taxes foods on 
unhealthy foods and beverages and further that there is a very real possibility that they may not be beneficial for health 
ĂĨƚĞƌĂůů ? ?ůůƐĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ?and Public Health England (2015) argue for the existence of price effects but note the limitations 
of existing research. 
3
 Part of the problem in developing conclusive evidence on the effectiveness of fiscal policies is to do with the fact that 
there have only been very few (though a growing number of) cases of actual real world experiences of the implementation 
of significant fiscal policy measures (Wareham and Jebb 2015). Inevitably, the bulk of the existing studies are either relying 
(1) on epidemiological modelling studies, the results of which critically depend on underlying assumptions and scenarios 
considered in the model (Briggs et al. 2013) or (2) on econometric analyses of the relationships between food prices and 
purchase, consumption or diet-related health (Powell and Chaloupka, 2009; Eyles et al. 2012). A limitation of the latter 
approach is that the observed variation in prices may be endogenous, resulting in biased estimates of the impact of price 
changes. 
4
 Other real world policy evaluations are presented by Cawley and Frisvold (2015), looking at short term price effects of the 
first city-level tax on sugar-sweetened beverages in Berkeley, California, and by Grogger (2015), also evaluating the excise 
tax in Mexico. When compared with observational studies that measure real-world purchasing, randomized studies can 
appear to lack validity and generalizability. The reason for this is that designing a randomized experiment necessitates 
simplification and control of sources of variability in order to make the study tractable and appropriately powered. This 
limitation brings with it a considerable advantage: randomized trials are a more stringent test of the causality than 
observational studies. Many claims from observational findings are not seen when studied in randomized trials (Ioannidis, 
2013) and may instead reflect complex and insufficiently controlled socio-economic patterns of behavior (Lawlor et al., 
2004).  The current study therefore provides key evidence needed to complement observational evaluations of the impact 
of taxes (such as Colchero et al., 2016) claiming that taxes do have a causal impact on purchasing behavior.   
2  CHE Research Paper 131  
 
At the same time, there has been growing policy interest in the use of  ‘nudge ? or  ‘choice 
architecture ? approaches to correct behavior without imposing major financial incentives or 
regulation (Sunstein and Thaler 2009; Marteau et al. 2011; Hollands et al. 2013), often invoking 
insights from behavioral economics.  Out of the wide range of potential nudge approaches, the idea 
of signposting information to affect their salience has been applied in various contexts, but not yet in 
the context of diet-related fiscal policies.  Chetty et al. (2009) may come closest in their attempt to 
increase the salience of a commodity tax on the price tag, finding that this did indeed increase the 
ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ?ƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀŝƚǇƚŽƚŚĞƚĂǆ ?Goldin and Homonoff (2013) find a similar effect to vary by 
socioeconomic groups in some but not all cases: high income consumers were less responsive than 
low income consumers to a tobacco tax that was levied at the cashier but were similarly responsive 
to a tax that was presented in the price tag.  In non-diet related settings, Sussman and Olivola (2011) 
find a general tendency for consumers to dislike taxes more than equivalent price changes.  Bad deal 
aversion (Isoni, 2011) may go together with taxation aversion, as consumers may see taxes as a bad 
deal.  
 
Our study is innovative in several respects.  We seek to combine both policy approaches in a novel 
field experimental setting, using a purpose-built online supermarket that is carefully modelled on a 
major real world online supermarket (Tesco).  Unlike the vast majority of lab experimental studies 
(e.g., Giesen et al. 2011 and Waterlander et al. 2012a, 2012b), which are drawn from psychology,
5
 
budgets and purchases are for real, i.e. participants are given budget and groceries (breakfast 
cereals and soft drinks) that will be delivered via a real supermarket to their doorstep.  We also 
restrict the sample of participants to people that have a latent demand for the product categories 
being considered, in that they have consumed cereals and soft drinks at least once in the last month.  
This avoids any power reduction and estimation bias by including people who do not generally buy 
either, but who may spuriously feel they have to in an experimental setting.  Unlike the small 
number of recent randomized controlled trials (RCTs) of subsidies to increase purchases of healthier 
foods, typically fruit and vegetables (Waterlander et al. 2013; Ball et al. 2015), we look at the 
potentially more interesting (from a policy viewpoint) case of taxes; we consider a nationally 
representative, large sample of consumers (of our two product categories), the largest we are aware 
of in terms of tax studies on diet choices; and we have an intertemporal check about the effect of 
the online purchase on other purchases.  Looking at a representative sample enables us to verify 
whether taxes on less healthy products are more likely to be effective or ineffective with particular 
segments of the population.  Some researchers have argued that taxation should have the potential 
not only to improve overall population diet but to simultaneously reduce socioeconomic inequalities 
in diet (Blakely 2014; Sharma et al 2014).  The opposite outcome, of course, would be of policy 
concern. 
 
Having an intertemporal consumption check enables us to have a first test, partial albeit it is, on 
whether there is any evidence of compensation effects where the study manipulation, while 
effective in terms of direct study outcomes, would be made pointless by later unhealthy purchases.  
As an example of this, researchers may observe less Coke being bought in a study.  This however 
would mean little if the consumer were to compensate by buying a six-pack of Coke at the local 
grocery store afterwards.  Our study is also innovative in combining price changes with modifying 
the way such price changes are implemented: as discussed below, taxes are either signposted or not. 
 
We focus on cereals and soft drinks as they are reasonably popular among UK households, include 
sizeable proportions of both healthy and unhealthy products within each category and are priced 
                                                 
5
 Within experimental economics, a partial exception is Yang and Chiou (2010), who have a laboratory experiment with 
university undergraduates and a small set of eight genuine beverages on offer; no real money or equivalent is however 
provided in exchange of unspent budgets, which may bias the results towards finding a price effect (which they do). Fevrier 
and Visser (2004) use real budgets to test the GARP axiom with an orange juice purchasing task. 
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within the experimental budget of UK £10.  From a public policy perspective, taxes on sugary soft 
drinks have been implemented in countries such as Mexico and are being debated in many countries 
(Cornelsen and Carreido 2015).  In relation to the UK, in a recent report by Tedstone et al. (2015), an 
introduction of a price increase of a minimum of 10-20% via a tax or levy on high sugar products, 
such as on sugar-sweetened beverages, was one out of eight measures identified that could help 
facilitate a reduction in sugar intakes.  Cereals are also interesting as they can make an important 
contribution to micronutrient intake and many of them also represent a good source of fibre 
(Williamson 2010).  However, a considerable and growing proportion of cereals have high levels of 
sugar and salt (Which? 2012, Action on Sugar 2015).  In addition, the market for both cereals and 
soft drinks is characterized by collusive pricing and intense non-price competition, meaning that 
estimation of price elasticity from naturally occurred variations in prices from observational data is 
challenging, though possible under structural models that make assumptions about the nature of 
market competition (e.g., Nevo, 2000, 2001).  This provides further justification for our field 
experimental methodology. 
 
We consider price changes of 20% and 40%.  A price change of (around) 20% is standard in the 
literature (Bonnet and Réquillart 2013; Briggs et al. 2013; Epstein et al. 2007; Waterlander et al. 
2012a, 2012b), it is at the upper bound of food taxes typically considered by policy makers, and the 
lower bound of what public health researchers consider as necessary for making a significant, 
positive impact on health (Mytton et al 2012).  ƉƌŝĐĞĐŚĂŶŐĞŽĨ ? ?A?ŝƐĂ ‘ůĂƌŐĞ ?ĐŚĂŶŐĞĂŶĚ
provides a stress test for whether any effect can be found, given the inconclusiveness of the results 
in the literature. 
 
In brief, our key result is that taxation of less healthy cereals and soft drinks has a sizeable negative 
impact on their purchases, particularly, in the case of cereals, when the price change is salient 
(signposted), though more generally the effects of signposting are nuanced.  ƉŽůŝĐǇ ‘ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ ?
tax value of 20% is sufficient to lead to large changes in behavior.  Furthermore, we find no evidence 
of adverse distributional effects between socioeconomic groups to worry about as a result of the 
price changes.  The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 describes the online 
supermarket platform, the product categories and healthfulness classification, and the experimental 
design, as well as providing details on participants, procedures, variables and the econometric model 
being employed.  Section 3 describes the sample characteristics and experimental results, section 4 
includes a discussion and section 5 concludes. 
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2. Study platform and design 
2.1 Online supermarket platform 
A website built to emulate an online supermarket platform was used.  The website is posted at 
www.woodssupermarket.co.uk and was developed by Cauldron Inc. for the BHRU.  The website 
mimics the appearance of a regular online grocery store, including browsing, search, unique product 
pages, trolley and checkout.  Image, price, full description, and a table of macronutrient were 
available for each product.  The platform automatically collects a range of data, i.e. product name, 
price, number of units purchased, price information, nutrient content, browsing history and time 
spent within the site.  The platform was built for assessing the effectiveness of a series of food 
purchase interventions (Forwood et al., 2015) and further modified for this study.  
 
In this study the range of products was restricted to two target categories  W cereals (189 products) 
and soft drinks (709 products).  The food database was a copy of the range of products for the 
corresponding categories from the largest supermarket chain in the United Kingdom, Tesco (scraped 
from Tesco.com in August 2015), supplemented with nutrient composition per 100 g (100 ml) from 
food (drinks) labels available at Tesco.com or from databases for common foods supplied by MRC 
Human Nutrition Research (Fitt et al., 2014).  Tesco ?Ɛ market share at the time of the experiment 
was 28.3% (McKevitt, 2015).  'ƌŽĐĞƌǇĚĞůŝǀĞƌŝĞƐǁĞƌĞŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĚďǇƚŚĞƚĞĂŵƵƐŝŶŐdĞƐĐŽ ?ƐŚŽŵĞ
delivery service (http://www.tesco.com/groceries/). 
 
2.2 Product categories and healthfulness classification 
As noted, we focused on the following product categories: (i) cereals, which included ready-to-eat 
breakfast cereals, muesli and granola and (ii) soft drinks, which included sports and energy drinks, 
waters, juices and fizzy drinks.
6
  Products in both the cereal and the soft drinks categories were 
divided into two groups: healthier and less healthy.  We classified products into those groups based 
on the same criteria used by the UK broadcasting regulator Ofcom to enforce restrictions of 
television advertising to children.  dŚĂƚŝƐ ?ďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞh<&ŽŽĚ^ƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐŐĞŶĐǇ ?ƐŶƵƚƌŝĞŶƚ
profiling (NP) model (Rayner et al. 2005).  ŶĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞŽĨƚŚŝƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŝƐƚŚĂƚŝƚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂƵŶŝĮĞĚ
measure of healthiness across all available food and drink products (Nakamura et al. 2015).  The 
model uses a simple scoring system based on the nutrient content of 100g of a food or drink.  The 
score for each product is based on the energy density, saturated fat, total sugar and sodium and 
protein contents together with an estimate of the fruit, vegetable, and nut contents.  An increase in 
the NP score reflects a reduction in the healthiness of the product. In order to classify products, we 
followed the same thresholds used by Ofcom to regulate food and drinks advertisement to children, 
that is, foods scoring 4 or more and drinks scoring 1 or more are defined as less healthy, and those 
scoring less are defined as healthier.
7
  Lobstein and Davies (2009) have a comprehensive discussion 
on the application of nutrient profiling models for public health policy purposes. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 We excluded fresh milk, fresh fruit juices and the like due to their perishability and the risk of problems associated with 
delivery. 
7
 Some examples of less healthy cereals arĞ P <ĞůůŽŐŐ ?Ɛ ZŝĐĞ <ƌŝƐƉŝĞƐ  ?ƐĐŽƌĞ A?  ? ? ? EĞƐƚůĞ ŚĞĞƌŝŽƐ ĞƌĞĂů  ?ƐĐŽƌĞ A?  ? ? ĂŶĚ
<ĞůůŽŐŐ ?Ɛ&ƌŽƐƚŝĞƐĞƌĞĂů  ?ƐĐŽƌĞ A?  ? ? ?ĂŶĚĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐŽĨŚĞĂůƚŚŝĞƌĐĞƌĞĂůƐĂƌĞ P EĞƐƚůĞ^ŚƌĞĚĚĞĚtŚĞĂƚĞƌĞĂů  ?ƐĐŽƌĞA?-6), 
Alpen No Added Sugar Muesli (score = -3) Dorset Cereals Honey Granola (score = 0). Examples of less healthy soft drinks 
are: regular tonic water (score = 1), regular Coke (score = 2) and Lucozade Energy (score = 3), while water (score = 0), Diet 
Coke (score = 0) and orange juice from concentrate (score = -3) are examples of healthier drinks. Notice that a healthier 
food or drink is a relative concept and depends on the threshold applied; hence it is not necessarily equal to what would be 
generally accepted as a healthy food or drink. A good example is diet sodas, which are healthier than sugar added soft 
drinks, but would not be considered healthy per se.  
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2.3 Design 
Participants had a budget (£10) and undertook a series of online shopping tasks.
8
  In each shopping 
task, items from only one product category (either cereals or soft drinks) were available for 
purchase.  In the baseline tasks, one for each product category, item prices were matched with 
Tesco.com prices (excluding promotions).  In the intervention tasks, the prices of the less healthy 
(healthier) products were taxed by either 20% or 40%, while the prices of the healthier (less healthy) 
products remained at the baseline level.  This results in a total of ten shopping tasks, five for each 
product category.  These price interventions allowed us to estimate the price elasticities and cross-
price elasticities of the demand for healthier and less healthy products within each product category. 
While only the case of taxes on the less healthy products is obviously of direct policy interest, we 
decided to be symmetrical between the two cases in order to avoid making overly transparent what 
the experiment is about, and therefore to reduce the likelihood of experimenter demand effects 
(Zizzo 2010); we also found of potential interest to compare direct and cross-price elasticities 
between the two sets of products.  
 
In addition, participants were randomly allocated to one of the following treatments: Signposted tax 
and Not Signposted tax.  In the Signposted tax treatment the amount of the price increase is 
presented separately from the original price and flagged as a tax, whereas in the Not Signposted 
treatment the price increase is kept implicit (only the final price is presented).  Figure 1 shows an 
example of a 20% tax on a less healthy cereal.  The objective of this manipulation is to assess the 
degree to ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƐĂůŝĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƚĂǆŚĂƐĂŶŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ?ĚĞŵĂŶĚ ?dŚĞƉƌŝĐĞ
manipulation was a within-subject factor while the signposting manipulation differed between-
subjects.  We used a standard Random Incentive Mechanism (RIM), i.e. once participants complete 
all shopping tasks one shopping task was randomly selected and played out for real, i.e. participants 
received the groceries delivered to their homes and the remainder of the budget was credited to 
them by the survey company (Research Now).
9
  dŚĞŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶƐŶĞǀĞƌƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽƚĂǆĞƐĂƐĞŝƚŚĞƌ ‘ĨĂƚ
ƚĂǆĞƐ ?Žƌ ‘ƐƵŐĂƌƚĂǆĞƐ ? ? 
 
 
Figure 1. Price manipulation: Not signposted vs. signposted 
Notes: The signposting manipulation was between-subjects, and therefore participants would either see the tax-inclusive 
prices as in the first panel, or the tax identified separately and flagged as a tax as in the second panel. 
                                                 
8
 A pilot experiment controlled for whether the fact that this money was not earned made a difference, which it did not. 
See discussion section for details. 
9
 The RIM is a standard experimental economics procedure (see for example Davis and Holt, 1993, p. 452, and Fevrier and 
Visser, 2004) and one of its main advantages is that it provides an incentive for truthfully responding to all tasks while only 
paying one of them; in addition it avoids: a) the wealth effect that would be generated by changes in the shopping budget 
through the experiment; and b) a portfolio effect, i.e. subjects (rationally) treating all the tasks together rather than 
separate tasks. 
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Participants were free to spend as much as desired from their £10 shopping budget, including the 
option of checking out with an empty basket.  We decided to implement this design feature against 
the option of forcing participants to spend all or at least part of their shopping budget, because the 
latter would inflate the purchasing data unrealistically and potentially bias the estimation of tax 
effects.  One of the potential negative consequences of this was having a large number of 
participants checking out with an empty basket.  We reduced the risk of this happening by limiting 
subject eligibility to consumers who bought a product from each of the two target product 
categories (cereals and soft drinks) at least once in the last month. 
 
In order to examine any potential compensation effect between our online shop and alternative 
shopping opportunities, upon completion of the online shopping, participants were invited to record 
their purchases of the two relevant product categories as well as the additional category  ‘chocolate ? 
for one week after they received the shopping basket delivered to their homes.  Below, we refer to 
this part of our study as the shopper diary. 
 
2.4 Participants 
A total of 1,000 participants (54.10% female; mean age 46.95, SD=15.9 years; BMI= 26.49, SD=5.28) 
completed the experiment.  All participants were based in the UK and the sample was representative 
in terms of regions, gender, age ranges and social classification.  Participants were recruited via 
Research Now, a market research online panel company (http://www.researchnow.com).  Quota 
targets were based on the Office for National Statistics annual mid-year estimates 2014.  We used 
three screening questions in order to restrict our sample to consumers who purchased the target 
products  W cereals and soft drinks  W at least once a month and were responsible for at least half of 
the shopping of their household.  We also excluded respondents in a diet for medical reasons and 
those answering incorrectly one or more of the data quality questions.  See Q1.2-Q1.5 and Q1.7 in 
the appendix for the questionƐ ? exact phrasing. From the total of 1,000, 281 participants completed 
the follow-up shopper diary correctly (49.82% female; Mean age 42.82, SD=15.43; BMI= 25.85, SD= 
4.87).  
 
2.5 Procedure 
Participants took part in the study over the internet between August and October 2015, and both 
participant and experimenter were blind to treatment allocation.  The experimental instructions can 
be found in the appendix.  The study was conducted using specialized online survey software 
(www.qualtrics.com) and the Woods online supermarket discussed in section 2.1.  At initial 
assessment, participants completed a consent form, questions about their shopping habits and 
quality control questions.  Participants not meeting the inclusion criteria and/or failing to answer 
correctly one or more of the quality control questions were excluded at this point.  Eligible 
participants were randomly allocated to one of the two experimental treatments.  Participants each 
completed ten shopping tasks, presented in random order.  Both randomizations were performed 
using a built-in feature within the survey software.  Product name, number of units purchased, price 
information, and total spending were recorded for analysis.  Participants provided their address, 
relevant contact details and delivery preferences.  Following completion of the shopping tasks, 
participants were informed which task (and hence products) was (randomly) selected to be 
delivered to them.  Personally identifiable information was used solely for the purpose of organizing 
the delivery of the groceries to the participants, who knew this. Subsequently, participants answered  
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a post-experiment questionnaire.
10
  Within the next eleven days participants received the relevant 
groceries via Tesco.com and any unspent budget was transferred by the survey company via panel 
points rewards of equivalent value (within 28 days after completion of the experiment).  The study 
protocol received approval from the University of East Anglia, School of Economics Ethics Committee 
(Application No: 0170). 
 
Participants completing the shopper diary received an email containing a link to a website which 
directed them to confirm the delivery of the groceries.  Participants were required to wait until 
receiving the groceries to complete the survey.  Once delivery had been confirmed (including a 
description of the items received) participants automatically received a link to their shopper diary. 
For a period of seven days, participants were instructed to record the following information every 
time they purchased one or more products within one of the three categories (cereals, soft drinks 
and chocolate): store name, name of the product including weight/volume and quantity. Participants 
were compensated for taking part in the shopper diary with a £5 shopping voucher. 
 
2.6 Variables 
In line with our main objective of estimating price elasticities for the less healthy and healthier 
products within each category, i.e. cereals and soft drinks, we used the following outcome variables: 
the total quantity of less healthy cereals (weight in grams) purchased in each task by each 
participant; the total quantity of healthier cereals (weight in grams) purchased in each task by each 
participant; the total quantity of less healthy soft drinks (volume in ml) purchased in each task by 
each participant; and the total quantity of less healthy soft drinks (volume in ml) purchased in each 
task by each participant.  For simplicity, from now on we will call these variables  “volume purchased 
ŽĨ Q ? as appropriate.  We now list the other variables. 
 
Socioeconomic status: As a measure of individual level socioeconomic status, participants provided 
ƚŚĞŝƌŚŝŐŚĞƐƚůĞǀĞůŽĨĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂůƋƵĂůŝĮĐĂƚŝŽŶĂƚƚĂŝŶĞĚ ?ĐŽĚĞĚŽŶƚŽĂƐŝǆƉŽŝŶƚƐĐĂůĞƌĂŶŐŝŶŐĨƌŽŵ ?
 ‘EŽƋƵĂůŝĮĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? to  ‘6 Degrees or higher ?.  As a measure of income, participants provided both their 
personal yearly income and their total household income before tax (participants selected from 4 
income bands in each case). 
 
Participant characteristics: Data on gender, age, self-reported height and weight (used to calculate 
participants' body mass index: BMI) the number of adults and children living in their household was 
collected.  Participants were also asked whether or not they were in a weight loss diet. 
 
Other control variables: tĞĞůŝĐŝƚĞĚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ƚŝŵĞƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐƵƐŝŶŐĂƚĞŶĐŚŽŝĐĞƐĚŝƐĐŽƵŶƚƌĂƚĞ
ƉƌŝĐĞůŝƐƚĨŽƌĂƐŝǆŵŽŶƚŚƐ ?ƚŝŵĞŚŽƌŝǌŽŶ ?ƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚŽ,ĂƌƌŝƐŽŶĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Participants were asked to 
provide an estimation of the number of days their stocks of soft drinks and their stocks of cereals 
would last until they would run out and need to buy some more.  Participants were also asked to 
provide a measure of the frequency they purchased groceries online, and the frequency they 
shopped at Tesco, both variables coded on a 7 point Likert scale ranging from never to more than 
once a week.  Finally, as a measure of price recollection, participants were asked to indicate their 
best guess of the regular retail price of six products, i.e. three cereals and three soft drinks.  
 
 
                                                 
10
 The questions included: recollection and awareness of price of products outside the experiment; stock of cereals and 
soft drinks in their home at the time of participation to the experiment; time time-discount rate elicitation (Harrison et al., 
2002) as well as questions related to socioeconomic, health and demographic characteristics, including: age, gender, 
weight, height, personal income, household income and education level.  Height and weight were collected to calculate 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ŽĚǇDĂƐƐ/ŶĚĞǆ ?D/ ?. 
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2.7 Econometric model 
We exploit the panel nature of the data in the analysis. Since the data on the volume of products 
purchased are censored at zero, we consider the following Random Effects Tobit regression model 
(Wooldridge, 2010).  For subject j in task t:  
 ௝௧כ ൌ ߙ௝ ൅ ߚଵ ? ?௝௧ு ൅ ߚଶൣ ? ?௝௧ு ൈ ௝൧ ൅ ߛଵ ? ?௝௧ு ൅ ߛଶൣ ? ?௝௧ு ൈ ௝൧൅ ߠଵ ? ?௝௧௅ு ൅ ߠଶൣ ? ?௝௧௅ு ൈ ௝൧ ൅ ߤଵ ? ?௝௧௅ு ൅ ߤଶൣ ? ?௝௧௅ு ൈ ௝൧൅ ߜ௝ ൅ ܢ௝ᇱ࣐ ൅ ߝ௝௧Ǣ 
 ௝௧ ൌ ௝௧כ ௝௧כ ൐  ?௝௧ ൌ  ?Ǥ 
  ௝ܻ௧ gives the volume of healthier and less healthy products purchased in each product category 
(estimated separately).  We use log-scaled variable because the distribution of ௝ܻ௧ is highly skewed 
(see Appendix A.1-A.4 for distributions).  
 
The key independent variables  ? ?௝௧ு ,  ? ?௝௧ு ,  ? ?௝௧௅ு and  ? ?௝௧௅ு are indicators of the price 
manipulations, representing the 20% or 40% tax on healthier (H) or less healthy (LH) products, 
respectively.  These variables are interacted with the indicator of the signpost condition.  For 
illustration, when the outcome variable is the (latent) volume of healthier products purchased, the 
impact of the 20% tax on healthier products (own price effect) is represented by ߚଵ, or ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ in 
the signposted condition.  Similarly, the impact of 20% tax on less healthy products (cross price 
effect) is given by ߠଵ, or ߠଵ ൅ ߠଶ in the signpost condition.  Note however that the coefficients alone 
represent the impacts of the interventions on the latent outcome (௝௧כ ), rather than the impacts on 
the actual outcome (௝௧).  We are interested in the latter, and hence we re-evaluate the estimated 
coefficients to represent the partial effects on the actual outcome.
11
  The vector ܢ௝ includes various 
other variables as discussed.  In order to take into account the within-subject correlation in 
purchasing, we estimate the standard errors of the parameters via block bootstrap, which gives 
subject-level cluster-robust standard errors (Bertrand et al. 2004; Cameron et al. 2008). 
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 This involves weighting of the estimated coefficients by the probability of not being censored. 
The impact of taxation and signposting on diet: an online field study with breakfast cereals and soft drinks  9 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Sample characteristics 
Demographic characteristics of participants are presented in Table 1. The total number of 
participants was 1,000, with a total of 506 in the Not Signposted treatment and 494 in the 
Signposted treatment.  There were no significant between-treatment differences in these 
characteristics.
12
  Demographic characteristics of the sub-sample participating in the shopper diary 
(N=281) are also presented in Table 1; 128 had participated in the Not Signposted treatment and 153 
had participated in the Signposted treatment.
13
 
 
3.2 Experimental results 
The mean quantity purchased across all tasks was 1.5 Kg of cereals and 5.6 litres of soft drinks.  Only 
about 5.6% purchases were zero (5.8% for cereals and 5.4% for soft drinks).  When only considering 
less healthy (healthier) products within each task, the amount of zero purchases was 13.5% (20.7%) 
for cereals and 13.2% (7.8%) for soft drinks.
14
  The weighted average price of purchased less healthy 
(healthier) breakfast cereals was £0.52, WSD: 0.20 (£0.38, WSD: 0.16) per 100g and for soft drinks it 
was £0.16, WSD: 0.13 (£0.10, SD: 0.11) per 100ml.
15
  The prices of less healthy products tend to be 
higher on average than those of healthier products, though the standard deviations are large.  
 
Figure 2 shows mean purchases of less healthy (healthier) products when prices of less healthy 
(healthier) were manipulated.  Figures 3 and 4 rely on the econometric model to show the estimated 
effect and confidence intervals for each price manipulation on the volume of purchases of the taxed 
products (direct price effects) for cereals and soft drinks, respectively.  The model estimates can be 
found in Tables 2 and 3, while Table 4.1 extracts the key information by presenting price and cross-
price effect estimates for less healthy and healthier cereals and soft drinks corresponding to each 
price manipulation and treatment.  While we report the results of regression models with the 
control variables, the general results remain the same with different combinations of controls or no 
controls at all.  Table 4.2 presents our best price elasticity estimates derived from estimations in 
Table 4.1, assuming constant and linear price elasticities between 0 and 20% and between 20% and 
40% price changes.  Mean values and distributions of volumes purchased at baseline prices and each 
price manipulation are available in the appendix (Figures A.1 to A.4 and Table A.1). 
 
Let us first focus on the Not Signposted treatment.  Both the 20% and the 40% taxes on less healthy 
cereals significantly reduced the volume purchased of the taxed products (p<0.01: see Table 4.1), 
though the effect of the 40% tax was not significantly larger than that of a 20% tax. A 20% tax was 
sufficient to induce a 48% demand decrease for cereals.  For soft drinks, in the Not Signposted 
                                                 
12
 dĞƐƚƐ ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚ ĂƌĞ WĞĂƌƐŽŶ ?ƐF2 (for gender) and the two-sample Mann-Whitney U test for the ratio variables. The 
distribution of the ratio variables, which departs considerably from normality justifies using a non-parametric approach.  
13
 We find some degree of self-selection bias when comparing demographic characteristics of subjects who participated in 
the shopper diary and those who did not. In particular, those participating in the diary were younger, were more educated, 
had a larger household income (p<0.001), and there is limited evidence that the proportion of males and the household 
size were slightly larger (p<0.10). The post hoc nature of these tests require some caution in interpretation; at any rate, 
none of these variables systematically change our key results, as presented later. Tests employed are the same as above.  
14
 Two observations out of 5000 are missing in the drinks category, because there was a technical issue with the 
supermarket platform and two subjects were affected, for which we lost the data corresponding to one drinks task each. 
15
 Reported weighted average prices and weighted standard deviations (WSD) are based only on products that were part of 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ? ƐŚŽƉƉŝŶŐ ďĂƐŬĞƚ ĂĐƌŽƐƐ Ăůů ƚŚĞ ƚĂƐŬƐ ĂŶĚ ǁĞŝŐŚƚĞĚ ďĂƐĞĚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƋƵĂŶƚŝƚǇ ƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞĚ  ?ŐƌĂŵƐ ĨŽƌ ďƌĞĂŬĨĂƐƚ
cereals and millilitres, for soft drinks). The average price of less healthy (healthier) breakfast cereals available for purchase 
was £0.52, SD: 0.14 (£0.41, SD: 0.26) per 100g and for less healthy (healthier) soft drinks it was £0.22, SD: 0.20 (£0.18, SD: 
0.18) per 100ml. The difference between the average price of available healthier soft drinks and the weighted average of 
healthier soft drinks is most likely due to large quantities of bottled water purchased by participants. 
10  CHE Research Paper 131  
 
treatment, a 40% tax was instead required to significantly reduce the purchasing of less healthy soft 
drinks. 
 
Result 1. With no signposting, while a 40% tax always works, a 20% tax is effective in reducing the 
demand for less healthy products in relation to cereals but not in relation to soft drinks.   
Let us now consider the Signposted treatment.  Again the 20% and the 40% taxes on less healthy 
cereals significantly reduced the volume purchased of the taxed products (p<0.01), with no 
difference between the two.  A 20% tax was now sufficient to induce a 54% demand decrease for 
cereals.  With signposting, a 20% tax was sufficient to induce a similar (52%) and significant demand 
decrease for soft drinks (p<0.01). 
 
Result 2. With signposting, a 20% tax is sufficient to significantly reduce the demand for less healthy 
products in relation to both cereals and soft drinks. 
 
The effect of taxes on healthier products is obviously less interesting as it is not policy relevant.  The 
picture partially mirrors that of taxes on less healthy products: there are broadly robust price effects. 
The picture is subtler with respect to signposting.  For soft drinks, their effects are significantly 
negative regardless of signposting, whereas for cereals they are only significant when signposted 
(p<0.01).  More generally, Tables 2 and 3 support a picture where signposting is not generally 
effective in nudging behavior on its own in relation to soft drinks, whereas it increases the 
consumption of healthier cereals and reduces that of less healthy cereals.  Taken together with the 
previous results regarding the demand for less healthy products, this leads to a more general result 
on signposting. 
 
Result 3. The effectiveness of signposting may depend on the product category.  Cross-price 
elasticities are interesting because potentially they are one (of course imperfect) way of controlling 
for compensation effects.  If, for example, I see higher prices for less healthy cereals and I buy more 
healthy cereals, this cannot be explained by the fact that it is a particularly good deal relative to 
what I can find in an alternative shop.  There is no evidence that a tax on less healthy soft drinks 
increases the consumption of more healthy drinks.
16
  There is, however, evidence that a tax on less 
healthy cereals does significantly increase the consumption of healthier cereals, though only for the 
not signposted category (p<0.05 with a 20% tax). 
 
Result 4. For both a 20% and a 40% tax rate, there is a sizeable cross-price effect increase in the 
purchasing of healthier cereals when a tax on less healthy cereals is introduced and there is no 
signposting.  There is no such cross-price effect for soft drinks. 
 
As supplementary findings, and focusing only on ones consistent between cereals and soft drinks, 
Table 2 and 3 show that men generally bought less healthy cereals and soft drinks than women, and 
consumers with greater stocks at home bought less unhealthily.  Interestingly, we found no robust 
evidence of greater income and a better education as a predictor for better diet choices, though 
there is some partial evidence to this effect in relation to soft drinks only.  Stocks of food were 
negatively correlated with purchases of less healthy food. 
 
Finally, we checked for potential differences in tax and signposting sensitivity by socioeconomic 
ƐƚĂƚƵƐ ?ŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ŚŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚŝŶĐŽŵĞůĞǀĞůĂŶĚĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĞǀĞů ? Tables A.2 and A.3 
show that the estimated effect of our price manipulations are not statistically different between the 
lower and the higher income group, while tables A.4 and A.5 show that there were no significant 
differences in price manipulation sensitivity between the less educated and the more educated 
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 There is a curious p < 0.1 decrease in consumption of healthy soft drinks with a 20% tax on less healthy soft drinks, but 
this finding is not replicated with a 40% tax on less healthy soft drinks. 
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group (95% confidence intervals for estimated effects overlap).  In addition, we found no significant 
differences when comparing the group with lower and higher body mass index, see tables A.6 and 
A.7. 
 
3.3 Shopper diary 
The mean quantity of purchases recorded over the required week in the shopper diary was 1.6 Kg of 
cereals, 7.9 litres of soft drinks, and 558 gr of chocolate.  A considerable proportion of participants 
reported no purchases of a given product category, in particular 39.2% for cereals, 21.0% for soft 
drinks and 27.8% for chocolates.
17
 
 
In line with our objective, we used these data to check for compensation effects: that is, when an 
item is taxed in the experimental task, participants may decide not to purchase the item but instead 
keep the budget and purchase the same or a related item in a grocery outlet  afterwards (at a lower 
price).  If this is the case, it would imply that we overestimate the effect of the tax in the experiment.  
 
We analyze the data in two ways, details of which are provided in online Appendix B.  First, we 
estimate the correlation between the volume of the products which participants received from the 
experiment and the volume of products in the same category they bought afterwards (as recorded in 
the shopping diary).  We do not find evidence that the volume of items purchased in the experiment 
is systematically and negatively correlated with the volume purchased within one week after 
groceries were received, which would point to compensation effects. 
 
Second, we directly estimate the impact of the experimental tax on the volume of items purchased 
within a week after receipt of the groceries by replacing the dependent variable of the regression 
model described in section 2.7 with the volume of items purchased within a week after receipt of 
the groceries, and otherwise using a similar econometric specification except that the total volume 
of items purchased at the baseline task is additionally controlled for.  We do not find evidence that 
the effect of the tax was compensated by greater purchases of similar products after the groceries 
were received. In addition, we found no significant increase in the purchase of chocolate in response 
to the experimental tax on less healthy items. 
 
Result 5. The shopping diary data does not detect evidence that lower purchases in the experiment 
due to the effect of taxes on less healthy products was compensated by higher purchases of less 
healthy products, within a week after groceries were received. 
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 The amount of zero purchases of less healthy (healthier) products was 59.4% (63.7%) for cereals, 56.9% (33.8%) for soft 
drinks. 
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 Table 1. Baseline characteristics of participants  
   Treatment     
  All n Not signposted n Signposted n   Diary n   
        
    
  
  
  
Age, years 
1/
   46.95 1000 46.72 506 47.18 494   42.82 281   
Gender (F), %   54.10 
 
53.75 506 54.45 494   49.82 281   
BMI, kg/m
2
   26.49 983 26.81 487 26.16 496   25.85 277   
Education level, %   
 
999 
 
506 
 
493   
  
  
   No qualifications   6.91 
 
5.34 
 
8.52 
 
  6.07 280   
   <5 GCSEs/NVQ Level 1   15.42 
 
15.81 
 
15.01 
 
  12.14 
 
  
   5 or more GCSEs/NVQ Level 2/1 
   A-level   19.62 
 
20.75 
 
18.46 
 
  15.71 
 
  
   2 or more A-levels/NVQ Level 3   21.22 
 
19.37 
 
23.12 
 
  21.43 
 
  
   ĂĐŚĞůŽƌ ?ƐĚĞŐƌĞĞ   25.23 
 
27.27 
 
23.12 
 
  28.93 
 
  
   Post-Graduate degree or qualification 11.61 
 
11.46 
 
11.76 
 
  15.71 
 
  
Household income, %   
 
908 
 
455 
 
453   
  
  
   Up to £15,499 per year   19.71 
 
18.46 
 
20.97 
 
  16.03 
 
  
   £15,500 W£24,999 per year   23.46 
 
25.05 
 
21.85 
 
  19.47 
 
  
   £25,000 W£39,999 per year   29.3 
 
28.13 
 
30.46 
 
  29.77 
 
  
   £40,000 or more per year   27.53 
 
28.35 
 
26.71 
 
  34.73 
 
  
Household size, n   2.64 
 
2.68 
 
2.59 
 
  2.75 
 
  
Total participants, n   
 
1000 
 
506 
 
494     281   
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Figure 2. Mean quantity purchased of less healthy (healthier) products when prices of less healthy 
(healthier) were manipulated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Breakfast cereals: Estimated impact of the taxes on the volume purchased of the taxed products 
 
Notes: Own-price effects that are estimated from the random effects Tobit regression model (see the regression models in 
Table 2) are presented. The bars show the average percentage change in the volume of purchases in each tax condition, as 
compared to the baseline condition without any price manipulations. Black bars show the effects when tax was combined 
with the signposted treatment. 95% confidence intervals are presented in the figure and are based on block-bootstrap 
cluster robust standard errors at participant level. 
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Figure 4. Soft drinks: Estimated impact of the taxes on the volume purchased of the taxed products 
 
Notes: Own-price effects that are estimated from the random effects Tobit regression model (see the regression models in 
Table 3) are presented. See notes to Figure 3. 
 
Table 2. Impact of taxation and signposting on the log volume of healthier and less healthy breakfast cereals 
purchased (random effect Tobit model) 
 
Less healthy breakfast cereals 
 
Healthier breakfast  cereals 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
      Tax less-healthy 20% -0.442*** -0.479***  0.985*** 1.060** 
 (0.080) (0.081)  (0.366) (0.427) 
Interaction with signposted -0.141 -0.109  -0.448*** -0.475*** 
 (0.192) (0.214)  (0.139) (0.141) 
Tax less-healthy 40% -0.657*** -0.709***  1.372*** 1.543*** 
 (0.055) (0.050)  (0.448) (0.534) 
Interaction with signposted -0.322* -0.0945  -0.421*** -0.520*** 
 (0.165) (0.226)  (0.148) (0.136) 
Tax healthier 20% -0.117 -0.184*  0.111 0.103 
 (0.111) (0.112)  (0.205) (0.220) 
Interaction with signposted 0.368 0.601*  -0.556*** -0.600*** 
 (0.258) (0.334)  (0.115) (0.109) 
Tax healthier 40% -0.0195 -0.0514  -0.258* -0.226 
 (0.148) (0.147)  (0.140) (0.163) 
Interaction with signposted 0.412 0.609*  -0.612*** -0.666*** 
 (0.301) (0.362)  (0.107) (0.099) 
Signposted -0.423*** -0.444*** 
 
2.371*** 2.357*** 
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(0.127) (0.126) 
 
(0.860) (0.868) 
Gender (male=1) 
 
-0.368*** 
  
-0.288** 
  
(0.122) 
  
(0.144) 
Age 
 
-0.0232*** 
  
0.0199*** 
  
(0.00681) 
  
(0.00728) 
Log BMI 
 
-0.177 
  
0.466 
  
(0.579) 
  
(0.584) 
In a weight loss diet (yes=1) 
 
0.0529 
  
-0.203 
  
(0.221) 
  
(0.180) 
Time preferences (discount) 
 
0.0305 
  
-0.0207 
  
(0.0271) 
  
(0.0297) 
Stocks of cereals (days) 
 
-0.0264** 
  
0.00630 
  
(0.0106) 
  
(0.00909) 
Online grocery shopping 
frequency 
 
0.0256 
  
0.0657 
  
(0.0572) 
  
(0.0601) 
Tesco shopping frequency 
 
0.0678 
  
-0.0353 
  
(0.0588) 
  
(0.0572) 
Accuracy guessing cereal 
prices 
 
0.187 
  
-0.107 
  
(0.253) 
  
(0.275) 
Education level 
 
-0.0411 
  
0.108 
  
(0.0725) 
  
(0.0757) 
Household income 
 
0.135 
  
-0.114 
  
(0.0918) 
  
(0.0960) 
      N Subjects 1000 853 
 
1000 853 
Notes: The analysis is based on a random effect Tobit model where each choice made by a subject provides an observation. 
Partial effects on the observed volume of log purchases are presented. The estimated partial effects are also transformed 
to represent the proportionate effects. Subject-level cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (block-bootstrapped, 
1000 replications). The number of subjects is smaller in the regressions with controls because of omitted answers to 
control questions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.  Impact of taxation and signposting on the log volume of healthier and less healthy soft drinks 
purchased (random effect Tobit model) 
            
 
Less healthy soft drinks 
 
Healthier soft drinks 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
      Tax less-healthy 20% -0.125 -0.147  -0.244* -0.242* 
 (0.170) (0.183)  (0.141) (0.141) 
Interaction with signposted -0.459*** -0.450**  0.717 0.506 
 (0.159) (0.179)  (0.454) (0.414) 
Tax less-healthy 40% -0.670*** -0.683***  -0.002 -0.064 
 (0.072) (0.075)  (0.206) (0.213) 
Interaction with signposted 0.0793 0.173  0.664 0.459 
 (0.320) (0.393)  (0.448) (0.420) 
Tax healthier 20% 0.127 0.240  -0.480*** -0.515*** 
 (0.224) (0.265)  (0.100) (0.103) 
Interaction with signposted 0.245 0.113  0.39 0.311 
 (0.347) (0.335)  (0.396) (0.403) 
Tax healthier 40% 0.061 0.0476  -0.502*** -0.503*** 
 -0.21 -0.223  -0.097 -0.102 
Interaction with signposted 0.665 0.497  -0.372** -0.347* 
 (0.453) (0.457)  (0.186) (0.207) 
Signposted -0.207 -0.196 
 
-0.16 -0.0282 
 
(0.220) (0.243) 
 
(0.213) (0.254) 
Gender (male=1) 
 
-0.291* 
  
-0.498*** 
  
(0.171) 
  
(0.0968) 
Age 
 
-0.0151* 
  
-0.000979 
  
(0.00849) 
  
(0.00702) 
Log BMI 
 
-0.653 
  
1.177** 
  
(0.704) 
  
(0.505) 
In a weight loss diet (yes=1) 
 
-0.464*** 
  
0.211 
  
(0.148) 
  
(0.256) 
Time preferences (discount) 
 
-0.0118 
  
0.00322 
  
(0.0331) 
  
(0.0278) 
Stocks of soft drinks (days) 
 
-0.0310** 
  
0.00859 
  
(0.0144) 
  
(0.0105) 
Online grocery shopping 
frequency 
 
0.0693 
  
0.0147 
  
(0.0669) 
  
(0.0565) 
Tesco shopping frequency 
 
-0.0170 
  
0.113** 
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(0.0692) 
  
(0.0545) 
Accuracy guessing soft drink 
prices 
 
-2.322** 
  
-1.903* 
  
(1.100) 
  
(1.018) 
Education level 
 
-0.153* 
  
0.108 
  
(0.0873) 
  
(0.0784) 
Household income 
 
-0.201* 
  
0.201** 
  
(0.117) 
  
(0.101) 
      N Subjects 1000 853 
 
1000 853 
Notes: The analysis is based on a random effect Tobit model where each choice made by a subject provides an observation. 
Partial effects on the observed volume of log purchases are presented. The estimated partial effects are also transformed 
to represent the proportionate effects. Subject-level cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (block-bootstrapped, 
1000 replications). The number of subjects is smaller in the regressions with controls because of omitted answers to 
control questions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
Table 4.1. Estimated price effects 
 
Breakfast cereals 
 
Soft drinks 
 
Less healthy Healthier 
 
Less healthy Healthier 
 
      
Own tax 20% (0.2) -0.479*** 
 
0.103 
 
-0.147 -0.515*** 
 
(0.081) 
 
(0.220) 
 
(0.183) (0.103) 
Own tax 20% (0.2) in  
 
 
 
  
signposted intervention -0.536*** 
 
-0.560*** 
 
-0.531*** -0.365** 
 
(0.083) 
 
(0.084) 
 
(0.114) (0.146) 
Own tax 40% (0.2) -0.709*** 
 
-0.226 
 
-0.683*** -0.503*** 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.163) 
 
(0.075) (0.102) 
Own tax 40% (0.4) in  
 
 
 
  
signposted intervention -0.736*** 
 
-0.741*** 
 
-0.628*** -0.675*** 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.054) 
 
(0.087) (0.078) 
Cross tax 20% (0.2)
3/
 -0.184* 
 
1.060** 
 
0.240 -0.242* 
 
(0.112) 
 
(0.427) 
 
(0.265) (0.141) 
Cross tax 20% (0.2) in  
 
 
 
  
signposted intervention 0.306 
 
0.0821 
 
0.38 0.142 
 
(0.201) 
 
(0.191) 
 
(0.314) (0.235) 
Cross tax 40% (0.4) -0.0514 
 
1.543*** 
 
0.048 -0.064 
 
(0.147) 
 
(0.534) 
 
(0.223) (0.213) 
Cross tax 40% (0.4) in  
 
 
 
  
in signposted intervention 0.526** 
 
0.221 
 
0.568* 0.365 
 
(0.244) 
 
(0.230) 
 
(0.335) (0.247) 
Control variables Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Notes: The results are based on models (2) and (4), presented in Tables 2 and 3. Partial effects on the observed volume of 
log purchases are presented. The estimated partial effects are also transformed to represent the proportionate effects. 
 ‘Cross tax ? effect refers to the effect on the volume of healthier (less healthy) products purchased when the less healthy 
(healthier) products were taxed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.2 Price elasticity (% change in demand in response to a 1% change in price) as implied by the 
estimated impact of the tax 
 
Breakfast cereals 
 
Soft drinks 
 
Less healthy Healthier 
 
Less healthy Healthier 
      Tax within the range 0 - 20% -2.40 - 
 
- -2.58 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Tax within the range of 0 - 20%  in 
signposted condition 
-2.68 -2.80 
 
-2.66 -1.83 
 
  
 
  
Tax within the range 20 - 40% -1.15 -1.13 
 
-3.42 
 
 
  
 
  
Tax within the range of 20 - 40% in 
signposted condition 
-1.00 -0.90 
 
-0.49 -1.55 
       
Notes: The elasticities reported on the table are based on the assumptions of constant and linear values for 20% brackets. 
Therefore for the 0 - 20 % range we divided our point estimate of tax impact by 20. To obtain the range between 20% and 
40%, we calculated the slope between the point estimate for 20% and the point estimate for the corresponding 40% tax. 
Missing elasticities represent estimations that were not statistically different from zero, as can be seen in Table 4.1. In 
order to calculate the elasticity between the range 20 to 40%, in those cases we assumed the point estimate to be zero. 
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4. Discussion 
Do taxes on less healthy products lead to healthier diet choices in relation to breakfast cereals and 
soft drinks?  The broad answer from our study is a clear yes, and quite independently of signposting. 
However, in the case of cereals, our findings suggest that signposting does seem to affect whether 
such taxes increase the purchasing of more healthy cereals (non-signposted case) or just reduce that 
of the less healthy cereals (signposted case). 
 
Does signposting matter?  The broad answer is that it depends, both on the product category and 
what we are trying to achieve.  We did not find that it matters in the context of a tax on less healthy 
soft drinks.  In the context of cereals, if the goal is to reduce the demand of less healthy cereals, 
there is clear evidence of a potentially substantial effect.  This confirms the notion of imperfect 
demand optimization in diet-related behavior (see DellaVigna, 2009, for a review of applications in 
other fields).  Our results show that the magnitude of this effect is potentially substantial, and would 
lend itself to a fairly straightforward, inexpensive policy implication  W that food-related taxation 
could be more effective when it is combined with signposting on the price tag.
18
 The implementation 
of such a complementary  ‘nudge ? policy would enhance the impact of the tax without imposing 
severe welfare loss, though we should recognize that its effectiveness may depend on the product 
category.  The further qualification to this is that the consumption of healthier cereals would not be 
increased in case of signposting  W this may or may not be problematic depending on a more 
comprehensive evaluation of optimal dietary choices. 
 
Our results are based on real purchases of a nationally representative sample of 1,000 consumers in 
the UK, the largest sample we are aware of for tax field studies on diet.  The large sample size and 
representativeness of the data, combined with experimental control over price and signposting 
variations as well as controls for compensation effects and a range of other factors, should provide 
more credible estimates of the impact of the tax on food and beverages, and should thus credibly 
inform the current policy debate on the subject. 
 
Own-price effects. We recognize that our estimates of the own-price effects are larger than what has 
been found in previous research (Briggs et al. 2013; Andreyeva et al. 2010).
19
  In comparison to our 
around 50% drop in demand for a 20% tax, Nevo (2001) found that the elasticity is on average -1.53 
in the US ready-to-eat cereals market, i.e. assuming linearity, a 20% and 40% tax would lead to a 
reduction in purchases by about 30% and 60%, respectively.  Our results do suggest that the 
marginal effect of taxation diminishes as the tax rate is raised from 20% to 40%, for both cereals and 
soft drinks.  Existing econometric studies typically assume a linear relationship between price and 
demand.  Although this simplification is practical, our evidence demonstrates that this is unlikely the 
case for grocery products and, hence, nonlinearities should be allowed for in estimating the effect of 
food-related tax reform. 
 
Our shopping diary data is not conclusive regarding the absence of any compensation effects, which 
of course may take place over a period longer than one week after receipt of the groceries, and may 
involve other product categories.  We cannot therefore entirely rule out that our elasticities may be 
overestimated because of potential compensation effects.  However, the evidence we have does not 
point in that direction, as (for example) we did not find a correlation between a reduction in less 
                                                 
18
 Waterlander et al. (2013) finds that the impact of subsidy on fruits and vegetables becomes greater when it is combined 
with an educational intervention. 
19
 Note that the fact that we have pre-filtered the sample for participants with latent demand does not explain why there is 
a higher estimate than in econometric studies estimates, as these are based on empirical demand functions that, by 
definition, rely on latent demand (e.g., if you never buy cereals, you will not affect the slope of the demand for cereals 
function). 
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healthy soft drinks purchases in the study and an increase in less healthy soft drinks purchases at 
least in the one week after the groceries were received.  Note that this is not because participants 
treated the experimental task in artificial isolation; the strong negative correlation between stocks of 
soft drinks/cereals and experimental purchases is clear evidence that this was not the case. 
 
The existence of uncontrolled compensation effects is nevertheless the greatest source of potential 
upward bias in the size of the effects, and something worth investigating further in future research.  
Our results should be considered as evidence for the effectiveness of taxation but less so as evidence 
for the specific quantitative size of the effect, which obviously needs to be seen in complement with 
other and non-experimental evidence.  That said, we need to recognize that the current non-
experimental evidence does not necessarily address the compensation effect problem.  We do not 
know the extent to which, for example, Mexican consumers have replaced sugar consumption with 
equally harmful sugar surrogates. 
 
One other potential limitation of our analysis is that participants may be subject to house money 
effects, namely they may behave differently if the money is just given to them  W as it was in our 
setup  W as opposed to being earned.  However, in a pilot we ran with university students at the 
University of East Anglia, we tested for house money effects and found no evidence of them in our 
setting (details available on request).  We therefore opted for simplicity in the online study design. 
 
Cross-price effects. Our estimates for cross-price effects within the categories show a nuanced 
picture, with mostly nonsignificant cross price effects.  Yang and Chiou (2010) estimate the cross-
price elasticity within the soft-drink category (divided by healthier and less healthy products) to be 
0.53 to 0.69.  Our data do not allow us to examine substitutions between dietary categories. 
Cornelsen et al. (2015b), however, show that between-category cross-price elasticity of cereals is 
modest (ranging from 0 up to 0.1).
20
 
 
Socioeconomic differences. Our results also show no significant difference in the impacts of taxes 
between socioeconomic groups.  Briggs et al. (2013) also predict no significant difference in the 
impact of sugar sweetened drink tax in the UK, and Blakely et al. (2011) do not find that the impact 
of a subsidy on fruit and vegetables differs by income and education group in their randomized 
control trial in New Zealand.  In ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚƚŽ'ŽůĚŝŶĂŶĚ,ŽŵŽŶŽĨĨ ?Ɛ ? ?013) study on purchasing of 
tobacco, we do not find significant differences in the effect of the signposting intervention across 
different socioeconomic groups.  Therefore, our results do not support the claim that diet-related 
taxation (with or without signposting) would reduce socioeconomic inequalities in diet and related 
health outcomes.  Neither though would our results give rise to the concern that such inequalities 
would increase.  Taken literally, this would imply that taxation could improve overall population diet 
without having to incur the cost of widening socioeconomic inequalities in diet (and related health 
outcomes).  There are not many population level preventive interventions out there, and even far 
less curative and screening interventions, that would share this favourable characteristic (Capewell 
and Graham 2010). 
 
One potential concern is that the tax may be regressive in making consumers with less income 
proportionally even poorer.  However, in our sample we find that on average less healthy soft drinks 
and cereals are at least as expensive if not more expensive than healthier alternatives.  To the extent 
that there is a non-ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ‘ƵŶŚĞĂůƚŚǇƉƌĞŵŝƵŵ, ?ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌĂŐŝŶŐĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐĨƌŽŵƉƵrchasing less 
healthy food relative to alternatives may leave consumers with at least as great or greater 
purchasing power. 
                                                 
20
 The comparison to the (cross-)price elasticities on cereals from Cornelsen et al (2015b) should be drawn with caution, in 
ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ďƌĞĂŬĨĂƐƚ ĐĞƌĞĂůƐ ǁĞ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ ŚĞƌĞ ŵĂŬĞ ƵƉ ŽŶůǇ Ă ƐŵĂůů ƐŚĂƌĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ƚŚĞǇ ĚĞĨŝŶĞ ĂƐ  “ĐĞƌĞĂůƐ ?  ?ŝ ?Ğ ?
cereals, bread, bakery, grains, flour, maize, noodles, pasta, rice).  
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Policy implementation. A policy implementation of a tax on less healthy food and drinks would 
obviously need to make choices on which products should be taxed (whether that be based on the 
FSA Nutrition score) or some other criterion.  If the tax is based on a nutrient attribute, industry may 
modify the attribute to avoid it, i.e. pass-through should not be considered as automatic.  Ito and 
Sallee (2014) found that this has happened in the market of cars, where a fuel economy tax is levied 
based on the size/weight of the car.  Grogger (2015) looked at the tax pass-through of the Mexican 
soda tax, and found that, in the short run, the price of sodas actually increased by more than the 
amount of the tax. 
 
A related policy question is the value of the optimal tax rate.  The maximum level of the tax that has 
been considered by policy makers is 20%, and obviously there are good reasons not to tax more than 
is needed.  Our finding of a nonlinear impact of taxation provides some support to a tax rate of 20% 
rather than a higher value, though this depends on the rate of tax pass-through as well.  Further 
research could look in a more nuanced way at the impact of tax rates up to 20% to identify where 
the greatest marginal gains in terms of increase tax rate are obtained. 
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5. Conclusions 
We have presented an online study with a representative sample of 1,000 U.K. consumers to 
investigate the effect of taxation targeted at improving diet.  The specific categories we considered 
were breakfast cereals and soft drinks.  Our study was innovative in a number of ways: the 
representative and large nature of the sample; the use of real as opposed to hypothetical choices; 
the focus on taxation, and combination of taxation with signposting; and the attempt to at least 
partially control for compensation effects with purchases in other shopping outlets. 
 
When the taxes were signposted to consumers, both the 20% and 40% rates reduced purchase 
volume of all the products they were applied to.  When the taxes were not signposted, reductions in 
purchase volume were only seen in less healthy cereals and healthier soft drinks at 20% taxation, 
and in less healthy cereals and all soft drinks at 40% taxation.  There were no differences in effects 
from taxation between socioeconomic groups, and we had a first, albeit partial, test for 
compensation effects with later grocery purchases. 
 
Our evidence is consistent with the conclusion that taxes on soft drinks or cereals are an effective 
means of altering purchases, with a 20% rate being sufficient to make a significant impact.  It should 
ďĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌǁŝƚŚŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐŽůĐŚĞƌŽĞƚĂů ? ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞ
Mexican case, in terms of estimation of the size of the effects.  Signposting represents a 
complementary  ‘nudge ? policy that could enhance the impact of the tax without imposing severe 
welfare loss, though the effectiveness may depend on the product category. 
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Appendix A. Additional figures and tables 
Fig A.1 Volume of less healthy breakfast cereals purchased.  
Graphs by price manipulation and treatment: (a) to (e) signposted; (f) to (j) not-signposted 
 
 
 
Fig A.2 Volume of healthier breakfast cereals purchased.  
Graphs by price manipulation and treatment: (a) to (e) signposted; (f) to (j) not-signposted 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28  CHE Research Paper 131  
 
Figure A.3. Volume of less healthy soft drinks purchased.  
Graphs by price manipulation and treatment: (a) to (e) signposted; (f) to (j) not Signposted 
 
 
 
Figure A.4. Volume of healthier soft drinks purchased.  
Graphs by price manipulation and treatment: (a) to (e) signposted; (f) to (j) not-signposted 
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Table A.1 Mean volume of products purchased 
   
Treatment 
Signposted  Not signposted 
 
Price manipulation 
 
Volume less healthy Volume healthier 
 
Volume less healthy Volume healthier 
Breakfast cereals (grams) 
      
 
Baseline 
 
813.74 ± 691.62 893.69 ± 945.66 
 
891.51 ± 688.65 587.9 ± 763.28 
 
20% tax healthier 
 
873.53 ± 703.26 687.50 ± 796.07 
 
868.66 ± 692.46 601.93 ± 733.39 
 
40% tax healthier 
 
921.05 ± 746.90 529.83 ± 653.27 
 
902.14 ± 713.59 491.49 ± 644.48 
 
20% tax less healthy 
 
596.72 ± 569.99 940.07 ± 940.28 
 
682.91 ± 558.63 770.39 ± 855.49 
 
40% tax less healthy 
 
483.38 ± 519.66 1,011.04 ± 976.94 
 
579.18 ± 532.97 790.23 ± 870.00 
 
Soft drinks (millilitres) 
 
  
 
    
 
Baseline 
 
1,757.37 ± 2,353.39 4,060.87 ± 5,739.97 
 
1,756.28 ± 2,238.03 4,429.20 ± 5,606.56 
 
20% tax healthier 
 
2,029.01 ± 2,497.30 3,384.31 ± 4,336.70 
 
1,830.94 ± 2,318.24 3,553.93 ± 5,010.78 
 
40% tax healthier 
 
2,187.08 ± 2,663.76 2,804.56 ± 4,056.63 
 
1,914.02 ± 2,390.07 3,258.98 ± 4,332.75 
 
20% tax less healthy 
 
1,327.33 ± 1,955.33 4,522.09 ± 6,194.51 
 
1,778.79 ± 2,204.05 3,946.48 ± 6,414.70 
 
40% tax less healthy 
 
1,115.59 ± 1,660.54 4,734.86 ± 6,142.03 
 
1,208.71 ± 1,914.59 4,539.86 ± 5,704.49 
Note: Means ± Standard deviation. 
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Table A.2: Estimated tax effects for breakfast cereals by household income 
 
Notes: The samples are split at the median of  ‘household income ? (lower income= less than £25.000 per year). The coefficients represent the partial effects on the observed outcome (log 
volume of products purchased), corrected to represent proportionate changes. 95% confidence intervals based on block bootstrap cluster robust standard errors in brackets. Control variables 
used in models (3), (4), (7) and (8) are the same as in Table 2, models (2) and (4), except for  ‘household income ? now being excluded from the model.  ‘Cross tax ? effect refers to the effect on 
the volume of healthier (less healthy) products purchased when the less healthy (healthier) products were taxed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Lower Income Higher Income Lower Income Higher Income Lower Income Higher Income Lower Income Higher Income
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
20% own Tax -0.512*** -0.392*** -0.568*** -0.426*** 0.288 0.0119 0.296 0.0159
[-0.724,-0.301] [-0.633,-0.151] [-0.760,-0.377] [-0.654,-0.199]   [-0.467,1.044] [-0.463,0.487] [-0.468,1.059] [-0.472,0.504]   
20% own Tax in -0.466*** -0.554*** -0.521*** -0.557*** -0.416** -0.557*** -0.464*** -0.545***
signposted intervention [-0.770,-0.162] [-0.732,-0.377] [-0.803,-0.239] [-0.747,-0.368]   [-0.744,-0.089] [-0.760,-0.355] [-0.755,-0.173] [-0.756,-0.335]   
40% own Tax -0.696*** -0.629*** -0.717*** -0.677*** -0.116 -0.337** -0.001 -0.334** 
[-0.850,-0.543] [-0.773,-0.485] [-0.864,-0.570] [-0.800,-0.555]   [-0.638,0.405] [-0.640,-0.0344] [-0.634,0.633] [-0.660,-0.008]   
40% own Tax in -0.798*** -0.745*** -0.807*** -0.728*** -0.601*** -0.768*** -0.674*** -0.778***
signposted intervention [-0.916,-0.680] [-0.848,-0.643] [-0.924,-0.691] [-0.842,-0.614]   [-0.835,-0.367] [-0.885,-0.651] [-0.868,-0.480] [-0.896,-0.660]   
20% cross Tax -0.238 -0.0302 -0.255* -0.075 0.708 1.175** 0.852 1.375** 
[-0.525,0.0502] [-0.358,0.297] [-0.541,0.030] [-0.405,0.255]   [-0.335,1.751] [0.160,2.191] [-0.273,1.978] [0.262,2.488]   
20% cross Tax in 0.382 0.105 0.443 0.147 0.035 0.135 -0.00637 0.148
signposted intervention [-0.257,1.021] [-0.287,0.496] [-0.209,1.094] [-0.268,0.561]   [-0.509,0.579] [-0.315,0.584] [-0.565,0.553] [-0.320,0.616]   
40% cross Tax 0.11 -0.096 0.0236 -0.146 1.749* 1.156** 1.925* 1.221** 
[-0.358,0.578] [-0.438,0.246] [-0.419,0.466] [-0.476,0.184]   [-0.058,3.556] [0.156,2.156] [-0.019,3.868] [0.212,2.229]   
40% cross Tax in 0.0369 0.668** 0.138 0.728** 0.0906 0.583* 0.0448 0.593
signposted intervention [-0.493,0.567] [0.0915,1.245] [-0.464,0.739] [0.106,1.350]   [-0.515,0.696] [-0.0813,1.246] [-0.527,0.616] [-0.116,1.301]   
Control variables No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
N 392 608 368 567 392 608 368 567
Less healthy breakfast cereals Healthier breakfast cereals
Manipulation
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Table A.3: Estimated tax effects for soft drinks by household income  
 
Notes: The samples are split at the median of  ‘household income ? (lower income= less than £25.000 per year). The coefficients represent the partial effects on the observed outcome (log 
volume of products purchased), corrected to represent proportionate changes. 95% confidence intervals based on block bootstrap cluster robust standard errors in brackets. Control variables 
used in models (3), (4), (7) and (8) are the same as in Table 2, models (2) and (4), except for  ‘household income ? now being excluded from the models.  ‘Cross tax ? effect refers to the effect on 
the volume of healthier (less healthy) products purchased when the less healthy (healthier) products were taxed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
Lower Income Higher Income Lower Income Higher Income Lower Income Higher Income Lower Income Higher Income
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
20% own Tax 0.0719 -0.235 0.193 -0.253 -0.192 -0.607*** -0.216 -0.588***
[-0.564,0.708] [-0.604,0.133] [-0.546,0.932] [-0.634,0.128]   [-0.667,0.282] [-0.796,-0.419] [-0.727,0.296] [-0.795,-0.380]   
20% own Tax in -0.420** -0.582*** -0.385* -0.569*** -0.497*** -0.0857 -0.508*** -0.157
signposted intervention [-0.833,-0.00625] [-0.809,-0.356] [-0.829,0.0599] [-0.820,-0.319]   [-0.821,-0.173] [-0.546,0.375] [-0.837,-0.179] [-0.614,0.301]   
40% own Tax -0.708*** -0.642*** -0.704*** -0.654*** -0.371** -0.569*** -0.322 -0.593***
[-0.899,-0.518] [-0.834,-0.451] [-0.903,-0.504] [-0.848,-0.460]   [-0.742,-0.002] [-0.775,-0.364] [-0.739,0.0945] [-0.790,-0.396]   
40% own Tax in -0.584*** -0.676*** -0.640*** -0.646*** -0.707*** -0.673*** -0.665*** -0.695***
signposted intervention [-0.890,-0.279] [-0.845,-0.507] [-0.914,-0.366] [-0.833,-0.458]   [-0.904,-0.509] [-0.862,-0.484] [-0.893,-0.436] [-0.879,-0.512]   
20% cross Tax 0.18 0.094 0.257 0.115 -0.123 -0.312** -0.109 -0.306** 
[-0.546,0.906] [-0.449,0.637] [-0.546,1.061] [-0.469,0.698]   [-0.714,0.468] [-0.610,-0.0145] [-0.693,0.475] [-0.598,-0.0145]   
20% cross Tax in 0.72 0.237 0.844 0.326 0.163 0.393 0.152 0.421
signposted intervention [-0.394,1.834] [-0.367,0.841] [-0.378,2.066] [-0.397,1.050]   [-0.476,0.802] [-0.311,1.097] [-0.455,0.760] [-0.328,1.170]   
40% cross Tax 0.0488 0.067 0.153 0.108 0.118 -0.0693 0.113 -0.127
[-0.584,0.681] [-0.463,0.597] [-0.527,0.833] [-0.473,0.689]   [-0.717,0.953] [-0.506,0.367] [-0.699,0.925] [-0.541,0.288]   
40% cross Tax in 0.832 0.724 0.707 0.666 0.483 0.787* 0.526 0.575
signposted intervention [-0.242,1.906] [-0.146,1.594] [-0.312,1.726] [-0.187,1.520]   [-0.278,1.245] [-0.0235,1.598] [-0.295,1.347] [-0.166,1.315]   
Control variables No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
N 392 608 368 567 392 608 368 567
Manipulation
Less healthy soft drinks Healthier soft drinks
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Table A.4: Estimated tax effects for breakfast cereals by education level
 
Notes: The samples are split at the median of  ‘educational level ?. The coefficients represent the partial effects on the observed outcome (log volume of products purchased), corrected to 
represent proportionate changes. 95% confidence intervals based on block bootstrap cluster robust standard errors in brackets. Control variables used in models (3), (4), (7) and (8) are the 
same as in Table 2, models (2) and (4), except for  ‘educational level ? now being excluded from the models.  ‘Cross tax ? effect refers to the effect on the volume of healthier (less healthy) 
products purchased when the less healthy (healthier) products were taxed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
No University degree University
No University 
degree University No University degree University No University degree University
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
20% own Tax -0.470*** -0.398*** -0.476*** -0.484*** 0.116 0.103 -0.00717 0.283
[-0.679,-0.260] [-0.653,-0.143] [-0.696,-0.257] [-0.716,-0.252]   [-0.372,0.604] [-0.549,0.755] [-0.499,0.485] [-0.507,1.073]   
20% own Tax in -0.458*** -0.624*** -0.499*** -0.593*** -0.363** -0.692*** -0.496*** -0.666***
signposted intervention [-0.699,-0.216] [-0.819,-0.429] [-0.723,-0.275] [-0.820,-0.366]   [-0.646,-0.0803] [-0.867,-0.517] [-0.734,-0.257] [-0.872,-0.459]   
40% own Tax -0.589*** -0.742*** -0.665*** -0.763*** -0.177 -0.369** -0.0985 -0.381** 
[-0.751,-0.427] [-0.866,-0.617] [-0.810,-0.520] [-0.877,-0.649]   [-0.578,0.223] [-0.730,-0.00857] [-0.574,0.377] [-0.748,-0.0147]   
40% own Tax in -0.808*** -0.668*** -0.781*** -0.629*** -0.670*** -0.776*** -0.716*** -0.789***
signposted intervention [-0.895,-0.720] [-0.851,-0.485] [-0.882,-0.680] [-0.841,-0.418]   [-0.825,-0.514] [-0.907,-0.645] [-0.867,-0.564] [-0.941,-0.637]   
20% cross Tax -0.128 -0.0998 -0.178 -0.194 0.975** 1.000* 1.034* 1.106*  
[-0.418,0.161] [-0.466,0.266] [-0.466,0.110] [-0.549,0.161]   [0.00531,1.944] [-0.110,2.110] [-0.00956,2.079] [-0.117,2.329]   
20% cross Tax in 0.207 0.21 0.262 0.39 0.268 -0.16 0.188 -0.0777
signposted intervention [-0.192,0.605] [-0.386,0.807] [-0.179,0.703] [-0.331,1.111]   [-0.267,0.804] [-0.583,0.264] [-0.362,0.739] [-0.559,0.404]   
40% cross Tax 0.0196 -0.0766 -0.0164 -0.0992 1.219** 1.627** 1.529** 1.560** 
[-0.381,0.420] [-0.461,0.308] [-0.423,0.390] [-0.503,0.305]   [0.0544,2.384] [0.196,3.058] [0.0822,2.975] [0.149,2.972]   
40% cross Tax in 0.188 0.842* 0.273 1.096*  0.654* -0.0202 0.337 0.04
signposted intervention [-0.235,0.611] [-0.143,1.827] [-0.219,0.765] [-0.0118,2.203]   [-0.0705,1.379] [-0.551,0.510] [-0.299,0.973] [-0.544,0.624]   
Control variables No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
N 631 369 525 329 631 369 525 329
Manipulation
Less healthy breakfast cereals Healthier breakfast cereals
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Table A.5: Estimated tax effects for soft drinks by education level 
 
Notes: The samples are split at the median of  ‘educational level ?. The coefficients represent the partial effects on the observed outcome (log volume of products purchased), corrected to 
represent proportionate changes. 95% confidence intervals based on block bootstrap cluster robust standard errors in brackets. Control variables used in models (3), (4), (7) and (8) are the 
same as in Table 2, models (2) and (4), except for  ‘educational level ? now being excluded from the models.  ‘Cross tax ? effect refers to the effect on the volume of healthier (less healthy) 
products purchased when the less healthy (healthier) products were taxed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
No University 
degree
University 
degree
No University 
degree
University 
degree
No University 
degree
University 
degree
No University 
degree
University 
degree
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
20% own Tax -0.202 0.00915 -0.198 -0.0673 -0.457*** -0.515*** -0.486*** -0.555***
[-0.604,0.201] [-0.559,0.578] [-0.631,0.236] [-0.645,0.510]   [-0.731,-0.182] [-0.785,-0.245] [-0.790,-0.182] [-0.834,-0.277]   
20% own Tax in -0.514*** -0.548*** -0.514*** -0.555*** -0.226 -0.362* -0.297 -0.494***
signposted intervention [-0.773,-0.254] [-0.866,-0.230] [-0.807,-0.221] [-0.885,-0.225]   [-0.624,0.171] [-0.781,0.0565] [-0.706,0.111] [-0.852,-0.135]   
40% own Tax -0.649*** -0.699*** -0.648*** -0.727*** -0.463*** -0.556*** -0.438*** -0.583***
[-0.843,-0.456] [-0.877,-0.520] [-0.874,-0.421] [-0.911,-0.543]   [-0.721,-0.205] [-0.816,-0.296] [-0.736,-0.139] [-0.847,-0.320]   
40% own Tax in -0.603*** -0.707*** -0.611*** -0.671*** -0.698*** -0.664*** -0.679*** -0.685***
signposted intervention [-0.813,-0.393] [-0.912,-0.503] [-0.845,-0.377] [-0.908,-0.435]   [-0.869,-0.528] [-0.900,-0.429] [-0.874,-0.483] [-0.934,-0.435]   
20% cross Tax -0.0759 0.521 0.118 0.443 -0.192 -0.318* -0.0605 -0.445***
[-0.549,0.397] [-0.289,1.330] [-0.521,0.756] [-0.406,1.292]   [-0.563,0.178] [-0.695,0.0588] [-0.541,0.420] [-0.765,-0.125]   
20% cross Tax in 0.653 0.043 0.517 0.176 0.431 0.0813 0.184 0.0802
signposted intervention [-0.191,1.497] [-0.626,0.712] [-0.327,1.362] [-0.618,0.970]   [-0.216,1.078] [-0.584,0.747] [-0.421,0.789] [-0.609,0.770]   
40% cross Tax 0.248 -0.18 0.301 -0.239 -0.036 0.0548 -0.00468 -0.143
[-0.389,0.884] [-0.655,0.295] [-0.419,1.020] [-0.703,0.224]   [-0.522,0.450] [-0.625,0.735] [-0.605,0.596] [-0.750,0.463]   
40% cross Tax in 0.552 1.198* 0.322 1.046 0.783** 0.458 0.505 0.16
signposted intervention [-0.189,1.294] [-0.174,2.570] [-0.403,1.047] [-0.307,2.399]   [0.0499,1.515] [-0.391,1.307] [-0.167,1.176] [-0.554,0.875]   
Control variables No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
N 631 369 525 329 631 369 525 329
Manipulation
Less healthy soft drinks Healthier soft drinks
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Table A.6: Estimated tax effects for breakfast cereals by Body Mass Index 
 
Notes: The coefficients represent the partial effects on the observed outcome (log volume of products purchased), corrected to represent proportionate changes. 95% confidence intervals 
based on block bootstrap cluster robust standard errors in brackets. Control variables used in models (3), (4), (7) and (8) are the same as in Table 2, models (2) and (4), except for the variable 
 ‘log bmi ? now being excluded from the models.  ‘Cross tax ? effect refers to the effect on the volume of healthier (less healthy) products purchased when the less healthy (healthier) products 
were taxed.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
BMI < 25 BMI A䠀 25 BMI < 25 BMI A䠀 25 BMI < 25 BMI A䠀 25 BMI < 25 BMI A䠀 25
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
20% own Tax -0.284* -0.548*** -0.292* -0.605*** -0.0958 0.323 -0.0595 0.311
[-0.590,0.0220] [-0.725,-0.371] [-0.606,0.0219] [-0.764,-0.446]   [-0.542,0.350] [-0.340,0.986] [-0.554,0.435] [-0.437,1.060]   
20% own Tax in -0.610*** -0.444*** -0.656*** -0.438*** -0.563*** -0.461*** -0.619*** -0.505***
signposted intervention [-0.797,-0.423] [-0.693,-0.195] [-0.826,-0.486] [-0.721,-0.155]   [-0.820,-0.305] [-0.708,-0.215] [-0.847,-0.391] [-0.754,-0.256]   
40% own Tax -0.623*** -0.683*** -0.615*** -0.769*** -0.181 -0.320* -0.218 -0.251
[-0.793,-0.454] [-0.818,-0.547] [-0.800,-0.430] [-0.875,-0.663]   [-0.668,0.305] [-0.645,0.00558] [-0.717,0.281] [-0.638,0.136]   
40% own Tax in -0.786*** -0.753*** -0.772*** -0.722*** -0.770*** -0.663*** -0.782*** -0.702***
signposted intervention [-0.902,-0.669] [-0.862,-0.644] [-0.900,-0.643] [-0.853,-0.592]   [-0.906,-0.634] [-0.835,-0.492] [-0.919,-0.645] [-0.863,-0.542]   
20% cross Tax -0.159 -0.0814 -0.16 -0.2 0.731 1.230** 0.828 1.390** 
[-0.461,0.143] [-0.410,0.248] [-0.486,0.166] [-0.486,0.0869]   [-0.276,1.738] [0.136,2.324] [-0.275,1.931] [0.111,2.669]   
20% cross Tax in 0.461 0.0472 0.482 0.143 0.173 0.0411 0.114 0.0905
signposted intervention [-0.156,1.078] [-0.360,0.454] [-0.139,1.104] [-0.342,0.628]   [-0.416,0.761] [-0.398,0.480] [-0.442,0.669] [-0.409,0.590]   
40% cross Tax -0.122 0.0742 -0.141 0.0324 0.649 2.213*** 0.542 2.813***
[-0.523,0.278] [-0.331,0.479] [-0.568,0.286] [-0.355,0.420]   [-0.315,1.613] [0.639,3.787] [-0.411,1.495] [0.738,4.888]   
40% cross Tax in 0.562 0.265 0.491 0.495 0.841* 0.0975 0.597 0.0222
signposted intervention [-0.110,1.234] [-0.236,0.765] [-0.181,1.162] [-0.187,1.176]   [-0.0752,1.757] [-0.423,0.618] [-0.205,1.400] [-0.493,0.537]   
Control variables No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
N 440 560 382 480 440 560 382 480
Manipulation
Less healthy breakfast cereals Healthier breakfast cereals
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Table A.7: Estimated tax effects for soft drinks by Body Mass Index 
 
Notes: The coefficients represent the partial effects on the observed outcome (log volume of products purchased), corrected to represent proportionate changes. 95% confidence intervals 
based on block bootstrap cluster robust standard errors in brackets. Control variables used in models (3), (4), (7) and (8) are the same as in Table 2, models (2) and (4), except for the variable 
 ‘log bmi ? now being excluded from the model.  ‘Cross tax ? effect refers to the effect on the volume of healthier (less healthy) products purchased when the less healthy (healthier) products 
were taxed.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
BMI < 25 BMI A䠀 25 BMI < 25 BMI A䠀 25 BMI < 25 BMI A䠀 25 BMI < 25 BMI A䠀 25
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
20% own Tax -0.178 -0.0762 -0.0827 -0.199 -0.515*** -0.450*** -0.575*** -0.472***
[-0.598,0.241] [-0.563,0.411] [-0.606,0.441] [-0.640,0.243]   [-0.793,-0.237] [-0.735,-0.165] [-0.844,-0.306] [-0.750,-0.194]   
20% own Tax in -0.517*** -0.532*** -0.515*** -0.554*** -0.392** -0.179 -0.455** -0.288
signposted intervention [-0.805,-0.230] [-0.807,-0.258] [-0.845,-0.185] [-0.835,-0.272]   [-0.762,-0.0212] [-0.615,0.258] [-0.805,-0.105] [-0.698,0.122]   
40% own Tax -0.679*** -0.662*** -0.634*** -0.701*** -0.382** -0.584*** -0.442** -0.572***
[-0.854,-0.503] [-0.861,-0.463] [-0.862,-0.405] [-0.894,-0.509]   [-0.737,-0.0263] [-0.792,-0.376] [-0.796,-0.0881] [-0.781,-0.363]   
40% own Tax in -0.656*** -0.634*** -0.673*** -0.600*** -0.707*** -0.671*** -0.667*** -0.680***
signposted intervention [-0.877,-0.436] [-0.834,-0.434] [-0.903,-0.443] [-0.836,-0.364]   [-0.895,-0.519] [-0.858,-0.484] [-0.894,-0.440] [-0.883,-0.478]   
20% cross Tax 0.264 0.02 0.6 0.0137 -0.026 -0.389** -0.0892 -0.365** 
[-0.437,0.964] [-0.518,0.558] [-0.346,1.546] [-0.544,0.572]   [-0.502,0.450] [-0.702,-0.0760] [-0.577,0.398] [-0.713,-0.0178]   
20% cross Tax in 0.425 0.39 0.288 0.452 0.102 0.465 -0.149 0.421
signposted intervention [-0.361,1.211] [-0.394,1.174] [-0.461,1.037] [-0.420,1.325]   [-0.494,0.698] [-0.269,1.199] [-0.625,0.327] [-0.321,1.163]   
40% cross Tax -0.139 0.261 0.0637 0.0647 -0.239 0.244 -0.338 0.256
[-0.617,0.339] [-0.390,0.913] [-0.580,0.708] [-0.512,0.642]   [-0.699,0.222] [-0.431,0.919] [-0.774,0.0987] [-0.485,0.997]   
40% cross Tax in 0.838 0.714 0.703 0.523 0.511 0.782* 0.275 0.497
signposted intervention [-0.209,1.885] [-0.158,1.586] [-0.356,1.762] [-0.355,1.401]   [-0.267,1.290] [-0.0244,1.588] [-0.428,0.979] [-0.200,1.195]   
Control variables No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
N 440 560 382 480 440 560 382 480
Manipulation
Less healthy soft drinks Healthier soft drinks
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Appendix B. Shopping Diary Analysis 
We analyze the data in two ways.  First, we estimate the correlation between the volume of the 
products which participants received from the experiment and the volume of products in the same 
category they bought afterwards (as recorded in the shopping diary).  In order to control for 
heterogeneity in general purchasing patterns, we include the volume of both healthier and less 
healthy items purchased at the baseline task (i.e. without tax) in the model.
21
  We conduct this 
analysis for healthier and less healthy cereals and soft drinks separately.  In addition, we analyze the 
volume of chocolate purchased in the shopping diary.  Chocolate is considered to be less healthy.  
Participants may purchase chocolates by way of rewarding their healthier choices which are induced 
by the tax. 
 
The results of the first approach are presented in Table B.1.  We do not find evidence that the 
volume of items purchased in the experiment is systematically and negatively correlated with the 
volume purchased within one week after groceries were received, which would point to 
compensation effects.
22
 
 
Second, we directly estimate the impact of the experimental tax on the volume of items purchased 
within a week after receipt of the groceries by replacing the dependent variable of the regression 
model described in section 2.7 with the volume of items purchased within a week after receipt of 
the groceries, and otherwise using a similar econometric specification except that the total volume 
of items purchased at the baseline task is additionally controlled for.  Again the analysis is conducted 
separately for cereals, soft drinks and chocolate.  If the participants facing the tax decided not to buy 
a taxed item but purchased it afterwards, we would observe a positive impact of the tax on the 
volume purchased in the shopping diary. 
 
The results from the second approach are presented in Table B.2.  We do not find evidence that the 
effect of the tax was compensated by greater purchases of similar products after the groceries were 
received.  None of the tax manipulations had a positive effect on purchases of cereals and beverages 
within the taxed category.  In addition, we found no significant increase in the purchase of chocolate 
in response to the experimental tax on less healthy items.
23
 
  
                                                 
21
 Participants for whom the randomly selected basket was at baseline prices (N=66) were excluded from the analysis. 
22
 We ran the same regressions using an OLS specification instead of Tobit and results are very similar to those presented 
here. Note that positive correlations between volumes purchased in the experiment and volumes purchased afterwards 
within the same category might imply a habit formation  W i.e. when more less healthy (healthier) items were received from 
the experiment, participants purchased more less healthy (healthier) items in the shopping diary, even after controlling for 
purchases at the baseline price (which we used as a proxy of the general purchasing pattern). It might also simply imply 
that participants have a similar purchasing pattern inside and outside the experiment, the effect of which may not be fully 
captured by controlling for purchases at the task with the baseline price. 
23
 Again, results are very similar to those presented here if OLS is used instead of Tobit. In some cases (notably in the policy 
non interesting case of taxes on the healthier products), the tax had a negative impact on the volume of items purchased in 
the same category (healthier products) even after the experiment. If reflecting a genuine effect, this might imply that the 
corresponding taxes had a sustainable impact on purchases after a week i.e. habit formation. 
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Table B.1. The relationship between the volume of products received from the experiment and the volume 
of products purchased afterwards, as recorded in the shopper diary (Tobit model) 
 
Breakfast cereals 
 
Soft drinks 
 
Chocolate 
 
Less 
healthy 
Healthier 
 
Less 
healthy 
Healthier 
 
If 
received 
cereals 
If  
received 
soft drinks 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
         Log volume of less healthy 
products received 
0.0244 0.195 
 
0.262** -0.209* 
 
-0.111 0.0155 
(0.141) (0.120) 
 
(0.111) (0.122) 
 
(0.103) (0.0865) 
         Log volume of healthier 
products received 
-0.120 0.269** 
 
-0.165 -0.0910 
 
0.172 -0.00469 
(0.139) (0.114) 
 
(0.110) (0.112) 
 
(0.113) (0.0838) 
         Log volume of less healthy 
products purchased at 
baseline prices (experiment) 
0.0759 -0.420** 
 
0.0672 0.0956 
 
0.194 0.0655 
(0.151) (0.167) 
 
(0.121) (0.128) 
 
(0.126) (0.0871) 
         Log volume of healthier 
products purchased at 
baseline prices (experiment) 
-0.0463 -0.469*** 
 
0.00945 0.128 
 
0.0453 0.0476 
(0.175) (0.126) 
 
(0.134) (0.170) 
 
(0.123) (0.110) 
         Control variables Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Notes: The analysis is based on a Tobit model with each subject as one observation. Products received after the experiment 
were either breakfast cereals or soft drinks, since only the outcome of one shopping task was implemented, and shopping 
tasks involved either breakfast cereals or soft drinks. Partial effects on the observed volume of log purchases are 
presented.  For models (1) and (2), the other variables are the same as reported in Table 2; for models (3) and (4), the 
other variables are the same as in Table 3, while for models (5) and (6) stocks of cereals/beverages and accuracy guessing 
prices of cereals/soft drinks were excluded as covariates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
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Table B.2. The effect of taxes in the experiment on the log volume of less healthy and healthier products 
purchased afterwards, as recorded in the shopper diary (Tobit model) 
 
Breakfast cereals 
 
Soft drinks 
 
Chocolate 
(less healthy) 
 
Less 
healthy 
Healthier 
 
Less 
healthy 
Healthier 
 
If  
received 
cereals 
If 
received 
soft 
drinks 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
         
20% tax less healthy 
6.537 16.44  3.325 -0.958***  0.0275 22.61 
(9.147) (17.87)  (8.963) (0.0775)  (1.314) (35.29) 
         
20%  tax less healthy in 
signposted intervention 
15.62 15.28  0.365 -0.438  3.690 -0.539 
(21.80) (21.11)  (2.442) (1.101)  (4.489) (0.456) 
         
40%  tax less healthy 
0.188 0.773  11.92 -0.704  0.818 17.83 
(1.799) (2.208)  (20.63) (0.469)  (2.709) (28.28) 
         
40%  tax less healthy in 
signposted intervention 
8.352 1.308  2.844 1.667  -0.396 -0.432 
(12.33) (3.292)  (6.375) (4.384)  (0.675) (0.486) 
         
20%  tax healthier 
5.512 -0.117  3.974 -0.965***  -0.830*** 2.235 
(6.636) (0.979)  (9.286) (0.0557)  (0.173) (4.972) 
         
20%  tax healthier in 
signposted intervention 
0.403 5.535  15.92 -0.707  0.580 
-
0.854*** 
(2.152) (8.292)  (30.53) (0.568)  (1.469) (0.203) 
         
40%  tax healthier 
13.14 -0.820***  3.304 -0.922***  -0.822*** 15.89 
(15.60) (0.264)  (8.230) (0.127)  (0.194) (25.64) 
         
40%  tax healthier in 
signposted intervention 
-0.284 3.958  23.96 -0.176  0.0920 
-
0.832*** 
(1.134) (5.828)  (33.45) (1.367)  (1.215) (0.175) 
         Control variables Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Notes: The analysis is based on a Tobit model with each subject as one observation. Products received after the experiment 
were either breakfast cereals or soft drinks, since only the outcome of one shopping task was implemented, and shopping 
tasks involved either breakfast cereals or soft drinks. Partial effects on the observed volume of log purchases are 
presented.  For models (1) and (2) the other variables are the same as reported in Table 2; for models (3) and (4) the other 
variables are the same as in Table 3, while for models (5) and (6) stocks of cereals/soft drinks and accuracy guessing prices 
of cereals/soft drinks were excluded as covariates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix C. Experimental materials 
Informed consent and screening questions24 
Q0.1 <Consent> 
This survey is a research project being run by scientists within the University of East Anglia, 
Newcastle University, the University of York and the University of Cambridge.  In order to proceed, 
we need your consent to take part in the study. 
 
Below is a link to the information sheet telling you more about the study. Please take time to read it, 
and if you have any questions regarding the study please contact the researcher, by contacting the 
Valued Opinions Services team by [Clicking here] 
 
[Click here] to see the Information for Participants. 
 
In summary your participation will involve the following: 
 
x Answer some questions about you and your shopping habits;  
x Complete a series of food shopping tasks using our supermarket website.  For this you 
will receive a £10 budget; 
x Answer a few more questions to tell us more about you and your experience using the 
supermarket website.   
 
After completing the shopping tasks, you will be asked to provide the following information: name, 
address and contact details.  This information will be used to deliver the products you purchased in 
the supermarket website using the shopping budget.  dŚŝƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĂďůĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶǁŽŶ ?ƚďĞ
transferred to any 3rd parties, except from Tesco.com, where the information will be used to place 
your order.  After 30 days all personally identifiable information will be destroyed and only 
anonymized data will be retained. 
 
Make sure you have around 40 minutes available before starting the survey. This is how long it will 
take, and it should be completed in one go. 
 
DO NOT START NOW IF YOU DO NOT THINK YOU HAVE THE TIME.  COME BACK LATER. 
 
Taking part in this study should not be harmful or stressful to you, does not require you to install any 
software, and will not require you to spend any money, other than the shopping budget of £10 that 
we will provide you. 
 
If you wish to withdraw from the study you can close your browser window at any time or contact us 
within 21 days after completing the survey and both your personally identifiable information and 
your responses will be securely deleted, and will not be used for any further purpose. 
  
                                                 
24
 Labels Q# in each question were not shown to the participants.  
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Q0.2 Give your consent to take part by confirming the following: 
 
 1. I have read, understood and accept the Information for Participants and have had the 
opportunity to ask questions 
 2. I understand that my participation is totally voluntary. I am free to withdraw at any time 
without having to give a reason. 
 3. I understand that all personally identifiable information will remain confidential and that it 
will be stored for 30 days before being destroyed. 
 4. I agree that the data gathered in this study may be stored anonymously and securely, and 
that data other than personally identifiable information may be used for research purposes. 
 5. I agree to take part in this research study. 
 OR I do NOT agree to take part in this research study. (You will not proceed with the study) 
 
Q1.1 Before starting the shopping tasks we need you to answer a few questions.  Your answers will 
allow us to determine if you are eligible to take part in this survey.  If you are eligible, you will then 
be able to participate fully in the survey. 
 
Important! - Data quality 
 
Please be aware that there are simple test questions in the survey that check whether you are 
paying due care and attention to answering all the questions. Please note that if you answer one or 
more of these simple questions incorrectly, you will not be able to participate fully in the survey. 
 
 Yes - I understand this and I am happy to proceed. 
 
 
Q1.2 Thinking about food/grocery shopping, which of these best describes the level of responsibility 
you have for the shopping in your household? 
 
 Responsible for all or most of the food/grocery shopping 
 Responsible for about half of the food/grocery shopping 
 Responsible for less than half of the food/grocery shopping 
 Not responsible for any of the food/grocery shopping 
 
Q1.3 Are you currently on a special diet for medical reasons? 
 
 Yes 
 No 
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Q1.4 Do you sleep more than an hour (60 minutes) in total per night? 
 
 Never (1) 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 Always (7) 
 
Q1.5 How often on average over the past year have you bought each of the following items for you 
or your household? 
 
 Never Not in 
the past 
12 
months 
1-3 
times in 
the last 
12 
months 
4-11 
times in 
the last 
12 
months 
1-3 
times a 
month 
Once a 
week 
More 
than 
once a 
week 
-Breakfast cereals               
-Soft drinks (including 
water, fruit juices, juice 
drinks, fizzy drinks, sports 
and energy drinks) 
              
 
 
 
Q1.6 How often, have you... 
 Never Not in 
the past 
12 
months 
1-3 
times in 
the last 
12 
months 
4-11 
times in 
the last 
12 
months 
1-3 
times a 
month 
Once a 
week 
More 
than 
once a 
week 
... shopped online for 
food or groceries to be 
delivered to you (e.g. 
Tesco.com, Ocado.com, 
mysupermarket.co.uk)? 
              
        
... shopped for food or 
groceries at Tesco? 
              
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Q1.7 To ĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚǇŽƵĂƌĞƌĞĂĚŝŶŐƚŚŝƐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇ ?ƉůĞĂƐĞƐĞůĞĐƚ ‘ǇĞůůŽǁ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞůŝƐƚ
below. 
 
Red 
Blue 
Green  
Yellow 
Pink  
Purple 
 
 
Q1.8 Are you planning to stay away from home for more than 3 days within the next 2 weeks? 
Yes 
No 
 
<Quality control criteria: (Q1.4) answer= 6 or 7; (Q1.7) answer=Yellow.>  
 
If participant fails quality control: Message: Many thanks for your responses! Unfortunately you 
answered incorrectly at least one of our quality control questions and you are not able to participate 
fully in the study. Clicking 'next' will take you back to the recruitment agency website. 
 
<Eligibility criteria: (Q1.2) Responsible for at least about half of the food/grocery shopping; (Q1.3) 
Not on a diet for medical reasons; (Q1.5) shops breakfast cereals at least once a month and; shops 
soft drinks at least once a month; (Q1.8) answer=NO> 
 
<If the eligibility criteria are not fulfilled: Message We are sorry. Based on your answers to our 
questions you are not eligible to participate in this survey. We sincerely thank you and appreciate 
your time and dedication. Clicking 'next' will take you back to the recruitment agency website. If 
inclusion criteria are fulfilled, next> 
 
 
Thank you for your responses! You have qualified to continue participating in this survey.  You are 
now going to complete the shopping tasks. Detailed instructions will be provided on the following 
ƐĐƌĞĞŶ ?ůŝĐŬ ‘ŶĞǆƚ ?ƚŽƉƌŽĐĞĞĚ ? 
 
Y. Instructions shopping tasks 
 
The computer will invite you to visit a website where you can buy from a limited selection of 
products.  This will happen 10 times.  From now on, we will refer to these shopping opportunities as 
shopping tasks. 
 
For each of the 10 shopping tasks you have a budget of £10 and you can buy as much (or as little) 
you want within this budget  W it is entirely up to you how much you spend. 
 
Each task will invite you to visit a slightly different supermarket website.  Half the time only 
breakfast cereals will be available, and half the time only drinks.  Also the prices of some products 
might change, indicated by a symbol and the amount of the price change. For example the symbol 
 indicates when the price has been increased by a Tax.
25
 
                                                 
25
 The sentence between brackets was only shown to participants in the Signposted tax treatment 
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KŶĐĞǇŽƵŚĂǀĞĂĚĚĞĚĂůůƚŚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐǇŽƵǁĂŶƚƚŽǇŽƵƌďĂƐŬĞƚ ?ĐůŝĐŬ ‘ĐŚĞĐŬŽƵƚ ? ?ǇŽƵǁŝůůďĞĂƐŬĞĚƚŽ
enter your delivery details and select which evening(s) you will be available to receive your delivery.  
Once you are done, confirm that you have finished and click the link to exit the supermarket.  You 
can then continue on to the next shopping task, or return to the online shopping website to re-do 
this shopping task if you are not happy with your choices.  If you accidentally close the web browser 
or a window before finishing the task, you can re-join the survey by clicking the original link to the 
survey.  You will re-ũŽŝŶƚŚĞƐƵƌǀĞǇĂƚƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚǇŽƵůĞĨƚ ?ǇŽƵǁŽŶ ?ƚŶĞĞĚƚŽƌĞƉĞĂƚƚŚĞƉĂŐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ
survey that you have already completed), and you can re-start any shopping task that was 
interrupted by clicking on the link available. 
 
After you have completed all 10 shopping tasks, the computer will randomly select one of them and 
show you what you bought.  dŚŝƐƌĂŶĚŽŵůǇĐŚŽƐĞŶƐŚŽƉƉŝŶŐƚĂƐŬǁŝůůďĞĐŽŵĞ ‘ƌĞĂů ? Pyour choices 
will be delivered between 6:00pm and 10:00pm on one of the selected evenings to the address you 
provided and any unspent money from your £10 budget will be credited to your Valued Opinions 
reward account. 
 
ůŝĐŬ ‘ŶĞǆƚ ?ƚŽĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞ 
 
Please use the link below to visit our supermarket and make your purchases. 
 
Remember: 
- tŚĂƚǇŽƵďƵǇŝŶƚŚŝƐƚĂƐŬŵĂǇďĞĐŽŵĞ ‘ƌĞĂů ? PǇŽƵǁŝůůƌĞĐĞŝǀĞƚŚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐĂŶĚĂŶǇƵŶƐƉĞŶƚŵŽŶĞǇ ? 
- You decide how you would like to spend your £10 budget.  Remember that the prices might change 
from task to task. 
- Check out from the supermarket and follow the link to go back to this page and continue to the 
next task. 
 
Link to open Woods Supermarket website 
 
Have you completed the shopping task? 
 
 Yes I completed the shopping task 
 
If you did not manage to complete your shopping and check out, or if you are not happy with your 
choices, you can click on the link to start this task again. Otherwise, click 'next'. 
 
Link to open Woods Supermarket website 
 
<Repeats until the 10 tasks are completed> 
 
dŚĂŶŬǇŽƵĨŽƌĐŽŵƉůĞƚŝŶŐĂůůƚŚĞƐŚŽƉƉŝŶŐƚĂƐŬƐ ?ůŝĐŬ ‘ŶĞǆƚ ?ƚŽĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞ 
 
The computer has chosen at random one of the 10 tasks to be real. That is, you will receive the 
products you purchased in that task and any unspent money from your shopping budget. Please click 
the link below to find out the content of your shopping basket that will be delivered to you. 
 
Link to the real shopping basket 
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The products you purchased will be delivered (by Tesco delivery service) between 6:00pm and 
10:00pm on one of the selected evenings to the address you provided us in the shopping website.  
Any unspent money from your £10 budget will be credited to your Valued Opinions reward account. 
 
Click the link below if you want to see again the content of your shopping basket and your delivery 
details. Otherwise, click 'next' to continue. Otherwise, click 'next' to continue. 
 
Link to the real shopping basket 
 
Z. Post-Experiment questionnaire 
 
Q3.1 In the following part we will ask you to answer some questions.  Please click 'next' to start 
 
Q3.2 Imagine that you have a choice of two payment options; Option A or Option B. 
 
If you choose Option B you will receive a sum of money 7 months from today.  If you choose Option 
A, you will receive a sum of money 1 month from today, but this Option (A) will pay a smaller 
amount than Option B.  Of the following two options which one would you prefer? 
 
 Option A Option B 
Option A: £300.00 in 1 month or Option B: £307.50 in 7 months     
Option A: £300.00 in 1 month or Option B: £315.20 in 7 months     
Option A: £300.00 in 1 month or Option B: £322.90 in 7 months     
Option A: £300.00 in 1 month or Option B: £330.80 in 7 months     
Option A: £300.00 in 1 month or Option B: £338.70 in 7 months     
Option A: £300.00 in 1 month or Option B: £346.70 in 7 months     
Option A: £300.00 in 1 month or Option B: £354.80 in 7 months     
Option A: £300.00 in 1 month or Option B: £363.00 in 7 months     
Option A: £300.00 in 1 month or Option B: £371.30 in 7 months     
Option A: £300.00 in 1 month or Option B: £379.70 in 7 months     
 
Q3.3 Please use the bar to indicate how long you estimate your stock of each of the items below 
would last until you would run out and need to buy some more.  
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Q3.4 Please use the slider beside each product to indicate your best guess of its regular retail price. 
 
______ Kellogg's Corn Flakes 750G 
 ? ? ? ? ? ?<ĞůůŽŐŐ ?ƐƌƵŶĐŚǇEƵƚŽƌŶĨůĂŬĞƐ ? ? ?' 
______ Coca Cola 1.75L 
______ Evian Mineral Water 2L 
______ Tesco Orange Juice from Concentrate 1L 
 
 
Q4.1 In order to finish, please answer the following questions about yourself. 
 
Q4.2 Your gender 
 
 Male 
 Female 
 
Q4.3 Your age (years) 
 
Q4.4 Your weight 
 
Kilograms/stones/pounds 
 
Q4.5 Your height 
 
Meters/feet/inches 
 
Q4.6 Are you currently on a diet to lose weight or to maintain your current weight? 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Q4.7 What is the highest education qualification you have achieved? 
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 None 
 hƉƚŽ ?'^ ?Ɛ ?/ŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ?-4 O Levels/CSE/GCSEs (any grades), Foundation Diploma, NVQ 
level 1, Foundation GNVQ or equivalents) 
 5 oƌŵŽƌĞ'^ ?ƐŽƌ ?-level (Including 5+ GCSEs (Grades A*-C),1 A Level/ 2-3 AS Levels, NVQ 
level 2, Intermediate GNVQ, City and Guilds Craft, BTEC First/General Diploma, RSA Diploma, 
Apprenticeship or equivalents) 
 2 or more A-levels (Including 2+ A Levels, 4+ AS Levels, NVQ Level 3, Advanced GNVQ, City and 
Guilds Advanced Craft, ONC, OND, BTEC National, RSA Advanced Diploma or equivalents) 
 ĂĐŚĞůŽƌ ?ƐĚĞŐƌĞĞ ?/ŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ?^Đ ?EsY>ĞǀĞů ?-5, HNC, HND, RSA Higher Diploma, BTEC 
Higher level or equivalents) 
 Post-Graduate degree or qualification (Including Higher Degrees e.g. MA, PhD, PGCE, 
Professional qualifications e.g. teaching, nursing, accountancy or equivalents) 
 Other 
 
Answer If, What is the highest education qualification you have achieved?  Other Is Selected 
 
Q4.7.b Please write below the highest education qualification you have achieved 
 
 
Q4.8 Please indicate your approximate yearly personal income before taxes. 
 
x Up to £15,499 per year 
x £15,500 W£24,999 per year 
x £25,000 W£39,999 per year 
x £40,000 or more per year 
x ŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁ ?WƌĞĨĞƌŶŽƚƚŽƐĂǇ 
 
Q4.9 Please indicate your approximate yearly household income before taxes (include total income 
of all adults living in your household). 
 
x Up to £15,499 per year 
x £15,500 W£24,999 per year 
x £25,000 W£39,999 per year 
x £40,000 or more per year 
x ŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁ ?WƌĞĨĞƌŶŽƚƚŽƐĂǇ 
 
Q4.10 How many persons - including yourself - live in your household?  
 
Q4.11 How many persons in your household are children under 18 years of age?  
 
Q4.12 Please indicate to which extent you agree with the following statement: The products I have 
purchased in the online supermarket resemble my regular food purchases of breakfast cereals and 
non-alcoholic drinks. 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Neither agree nor disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
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Q4.13 Please tell us if you have any comments or anything you think we should know about your 
experience of taking part in this study! 
 
Y ? ? ? ?DĂŶǇƚŚĂŶŬƐĨŽƌƚĂŬŝŶŐƉĂƌƚ ?ůŝĐŬŝŶŐ ‘ŶĞǆƚ ? ?ǁŝůůƚĂŬĞǇŽƵďĂĐŬƚŽƚŚĞƌĞĐƌƵŝƚŵĞŶƚĂŐĞŶĐǇ
website.    
 
 
